After Pearl Harbor, a declaration of war against Germany would have been impossible to get had Hitler not declared war against the US. Indeed, Congress would probably have axed Lend-Lease because that equipment could be used Japan instead.
I'd be surprised. There were already bloody flags to be waved and more being accumulated all the time as the Battle of the Atlantic ramped up, such as the fate of the Reuben James, Kearny, and Robin Moor, and most of these ships were light combatants that would not have been as critical in the Pacific given the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor were disproportionately borne by the fleet's battlewagons. The allies fighting against Germany were also the same allies presently fighting against Japan: Pearl Harbor was accompanied by similar attacks at Hong Kong, and attacks aimed at Malaya and the DEI would go off literally within 24 hours of Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong. It wouldn't be much of a stretch, especially with a growing push by the executive branch and pro-British interventionists behind it, to go after "the perfidious Nips' Hun allies, who have subjugated Europe and even now threaten valiant Britain, attacking American shipping and providing both material and moral aid to the Nips," or some variant on that sort of phrasing. With over 70% of Americans agreeing that Nazi Germany was the biggest threat in late 1941 before the German declaration of war, I could still see a formal declaration of war against Germany being pushed through by 1942 or 1943 at the very latest. Certainly, that presumption was a significant part in the apparent reasoning by the Germans to make the declaration of war formal: it allowed the Germans to take the submarine war to the Americans, who were already acting as belligerents, and further strangle the Home Isles, based on the gamble that they could win before the US got into gear.
That said, I could see Lend-Lease being cut back for domestic rearmament. Indeed, after all, that's what did happen; the increase in Lend-Lease slowed as arming the new waves of American recruits became more important. I could also see the delay making a Europe-First policy being more difficult, as the Japan-First policy would have time to gain momentum. Of course, on the flip side, Operation Torch didn't go off until November of 1942, so a delay may not be that crippling.