They did want to fight; they just didn't want to bring the fight to the Germans, but rather for the Germans to bring the fight to them, where they could then cut it off and rip it to pieces in Belgium.
Considering the state of Siegfried Line in 1939 (the Germans themselves said it was little more than construction site at the time) and how well manned it was (almost the whole army was busy in Poland), I would risk saying that France and Britain could end the war in 1940 (or even in 1939 if they pushed really hard), simply by going through nearly non-existent line and going straight for Berlin. And as for cutting it off and ripping to pieces in Belgium... well, yeah, you see how that worked out.
But of course, better to die on your own land than on theirs, right?
I agree on the state of the Siegfried Line and a potential 1940 victory, albeit with the caveat that the French were unaware of the true state of affairs in the West (and the further caveat that they made little effort to ascertain the truth). I was specifying the strategic operating parameters of the Allied High Command at that point in time, under the explicitly-outlined presuppositions in that post, and how under these presuppositions their operational plans were not simply a matter of "waiting to die," but rather an attempt to ensure victory under what were unfortunately later proven to be invalid premises. The fact that they were wrong does not mean that they were attempting to fail or come to terms with Nazi Germany; to be less charitable to the French High Command, stupidity (insofar as you call hewing to past experience a bit too much "stupidity") does not require malice.
French tanks were arguably the best of the day. Unfortunately, they were also slow (both tactically on the battlefield and strategically moving between battles), unreliable, and often required refueling, limiting their range further. They were well-designed for their role as infantry-support vehicles to secure the battlefield in a riposte from defensive positions, but extremely poorly-suited to the offensive exploitation of the now-dislodged enemy of the sort that, say, the like of Guderian demonstrated in his race against his own QM corps. This is, again, in keeping with the general trend of the French High Command's preparations for a war in the same style, and more importantly speed, as the First World War. Communications was famously sub-par, as illustrated in the lack of radios; the size of the army was indeed the largest in Western Europe (and arguably the second-largest behind the USSR) but again, hampered by its leadership's poor assumptions. All of this played into their poor showing in the Battle of France, as well as their inability to sustain an offensive. Critically, however, the French had captured the German war plans in January 1940; they knew the main thrust was going to come over the Dyle and run into the heart of their strength, set up in defensive positions. They knew the Germans had fallen for their deceptions, and thus didn't know they knew. The problem is that Hitler changed the plans anyways because he favored Rundstedt and Manstein's daring over Halder's caution, and as we all know, what the French knew came back to bite them in the rear.
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Topic: Sheb's European Megathread: Remove Feta! (Read 1784808 times)