Print

Please login or register.
1 Hour 1 Day 1 Week 1 Month Forever
Login with username, password and session length

[Tarran]

@Tarran: Does the fact that my mind has “moving parts” make the difference?

Yes, without a doubt.

Actually, I think we have a way around the problem, assuming FTL data transmission exists (given teleportation, it should): Upload your consciousness to a computer, transmit it to the destination, download it into the body of a clone. Your consciousness is intact at all stages of the operation.

That's... still questionable.

[kaijyuu]

@Flying Dice
Assuming your "consciousness" CAN be digitized. Hell, assuming it even exists; we all claim to "see" and "feel" the world around us, but any significantly advanced computer could do the same.

Either there's an entity separate from that ("souls" or similar), or consciousness as we know it arises naturally from any significantly complex system. In the former case, getting it inside a computer requires black magic, and in the latter case, the consciousness that represents "you" cannot exist separate from its system, so transferal is impossible.

[GlyphGryph]

Imagine I have an axe. Someone else wants it.

I eventually replace my axe head, buying a new one. That thief steals it from the trash.
A while later I replace the handle. The thief steals it again.

Is my axe the same axe as the old one? What if the thief uses the old pieces and puts them back together? Do I suddenly have TWO axes that are the same as the old one!?


It's all retardedly stupid. I appreciate that our brains really dig categorization, but none of this shit actually matters in the slightest. It's only useful as a cognitive shortcut in day to day life and other than that has no actual meaning whatsoever. When the shortcut stops working, the appropriate thing to do is stop using it.

Also, do you people really believe that someone getting knocked out makes them a completely different person when they wake back up?

Going to sleep every night must be terrifying for you lot.

[Frumple]

Actually, I think we have a way around the problem, assuming FTL data transmission exists (given teleportation, it should): Upload your consciousness to a computer, transmit it to the destination, download it into the body of a clone. Your consciousness is intact at all stages of the operation.

Flip side of that, though... if we can digitize our consciousness (whatever the hell that ends up being), why in blazes stick it back in silly flesh bag? I'll take my world-destroying giant robot plzkthx.

Let's start with brain or head transplants first, I think. We've got that (the latter, anyway) to work in monkeys, need to do it to a few humans and see if they still think of themselves as themselves with the brain swapped around. Then we'll have isolated whether a human is their brain or their body; go from that to digitization (if it's just the brain, well, full simulation of brain. Huzzah, consciousness.) and ohgods the religious backlash would be hilarious. Where is your soul now, eh? This flash drive? Mweeheehee.

[Flying Dice]

Of course we're assuming that it would require computer systems capable of tranferring and storing human consciousness without any flaws or difficulties, along with the assumption that a human mind can even exist outside of the shell that normally contains it. But then, we're discussing the merits of teleportation, so I sort of assumed that people wouldn't object to hypothetical, wildly improbable technology.

[Criptfeind]

Gradual teleportation...

WHAT?

That would be worse! As soon as it started happening your experiences with your copy would diverge. You would have no way to truly call that other one yourself because it would not be!

The opposite of gradual should be the answer. Destruction of the first one before the copy is created is the way to make sure the copy is yourself. Otherwise even the smallest differences will make it another person.

Actually, I think we have a way around the problem, assuming FTL data transmission exists (given teleportation, it should): Upload your consciousness to a computer, transmit it to the destination, download it into the body of a clone. Your consciousness is intact at all stages of the operation.

How is this differing in any way? You would still only be be information. There is no intact consciousness with only data transmission. You would need to be able to move a faster then light brain holding super computer. And by that point you might as well be able to move the person faster then light.

Going to sleep every night must be terrifying for you lot.

How so? The brain is still active in sleep.

Although yeah. I agree. I mean. Everyone who is against this. Go back and read your post that you wrote about being against it. That was not you that wrote it, it was past you. Same as reading this, it was/is past you. You are not the same person as you used to be. Hell, in this theoretical thing it would be even better, since a snap shot of you would last longer then the very short time it does now.

Then we'll have isolated whether a human is their brain or their body

Don't we already sort of know this? I mean, we are not even the brain per say, just the way the brain is arranged right? And the brain has it's own photo of how the body looks. So just porting a brain over to a body that is not a copy of the one it had before would be disorientating, but not because they are missing something from their body, but rather that the brain thinks it is.

[fqllve]

Also, do you people really believe that someone getting knocked out makes them a completely different person when they wake back up?

Going to sleep every night must be terrifying for you lot.

That's just a product of the conflation of two of the meanings of the word consciousness. One being roughly equal to awareness and the other being the sum of a person's personality and self-reflection.

[Fenrir]

Actually, I think we have a way around the problem, assuming FTL data transmission exists (given teleportation, it should): Upload your consciousness to a computer, transmit it to the destination, download it into the body of a clone. Your consciousness is intact at all stages of the operation.

To upload is to make a copy. No one sends a hard-disk platter through the aether. I am no neuroscientist, but I expect that the information that comprises the human mind is as much a mere arrangement of matter as the files on my magnetic disks.

@Tarran: Does the fact that my mind has “moving parts” make the difference?

Yes, without a doubt.

Why? If I made the same analogy with a pair of computers, would it make a difference?

FAKE-EDIT: Damn ninjas.

[Criptfeind]

If you made the same analogy with sapient computers maybe.

[darkflagrance]

The problem is that we're talking about a phenomenon that cannot even be measured: human consciousness as the conscious person himself experiences it.

The philosophical zombie is putatively a being that, though in all other respects identical to a human, including behaviorally and in terms of response, lacks true consciousness that is the voice in your head whispering to you or the thing that looks out through your eyes. However, the p-zombie writes books, partakes in philosophical discourse, and loudly claims that it is conscious the same way everyone else is. The problem is that no test will prove whether the p-zombie has or has not true consciousness; we can only prove that it acts in exactly the same way as conscious person.

There is the same problem with the teleporter. The clone that pops out the other side will, to everyone who interacts it, be the you who moved through the teleporter. It has your thoughts, your memories, your dreams and desires; in all measurable respects it is you. But nobody can prove that the thing inside its head, that whispers thoughts and gazes out through your eyes, is the same as that of the original you who entered the teleporter. That consciousness may have died, and a new one may be inhabiting the body of the teleporter-clone, and only you by virtue of your non-existence experience (or don't experience) the consequences.

The problem of the transfer of consciousness is totally different from that of the grandfather's axe. The latter is a paradox of categorization. The former is a true mystery.

[Criptfeind]

Is that worth thinking about though? You can not prove anyone, even yourself has... What? A soul?

We can prove that this copy is seeing. We can prove this copy is thinking. We can prove this copy is acting the same way and thinking the same thoughts. At that point, how can you say it is a different consciousness without essentially bringing in mysticism by calling upon the soul?

Edit: And if the soul makes no difference in thought or behavior, why is it considered worthwhile? I would not mind if going though the teleporter scrubbed my teeth, cut out my appendix, pulled out wisdom teeth and failed to remake the content of my intestines. Why should I care about the soul?

[darkflagrance]

Is that worth thinking about though? You can not prove anyone, even yourself has... What? A soul?

We can prove that this copy is seeing. We can prove this copy is thinking. We can prove this copy is acting the same way and thinking the same thoughts. At that point, how can you say it is a different consciousness without essentially bringing in mysticism by calling upon the soul?

This is exactly the problem that this thread is arguing in favor for. Of course the clone will be exactly the same as you in all measurable ways. The reason it fills people with revulsion is that we don't think the clone will have the same soul. Gradual replacement is invoked as a way to assure that the soul remains intact.

The entire thread is about mysticism!!!

[Gatleos]

Is that worth thinking about though? You can not prove anyone, even yourself has... What? A soul?

We can prove that this copy is seeing. We can prove this copy is thinking. We can prove this copy is acting the same way and thinking the same thoughts. At that point, how can you say it is a different consciousness without essentially bringing in mysticism by calling upon the soul?

It's worth thinking about for the guy about to step into the teleporter and potentially meet oblivion. The answer to the question itself doesn't matter, just the implications. Like you said, it's effectively the same to the copy. But what about the original, if there is one?

[Tarran]

Although yeah. I agree. I mean. Everyone who is against this. Go back and read your post that you wrote about being against it. That was not you that wrote it, it was past you. Same as reading this, it was/is past you. You are not the same person as you used to be. Hell, in this theoretical thing it would be even better, since a snap shot of you would last longer then the very short time it does now.

Past me is still me. It's like a line. The start of the line is still part of the end of the line.

Teleporting a person would be like drawing a line, ending it, and copying it exactly and continuing on without attaching it to the part before.

Is that worth thinking about though?

For some, yes. For others, likely no.

You can not prove anyone, even yourself has... What? A soul?

Can you prove that we don't?

Edit: And if the soul makes no difference in thought or behavior, why is it considered worthwhile? I would not mind if going though the teleporter scrubbed my teeth, cut out my appendix, pulled out wisdom teeth and failed to remake the content of my intestines. Why should I care about the soul?

Just because you don't care doesn't mean that others don't.

[fqllve]

Is that worth thinking about though? You can not prove anyone, even yourself has... What? A soul?

We can prove that this copy is seeing. We can prove this copy is thinking. We can prove this copy is acting the same way and thinking the same thoughts. At that point, how can you say it is a different consciousness without essentially bringing in mysticism by calling upon the soul?

Edit: And if the soul makes no difference in thought or behavior, why is it considered worthwhile? I would not mind if going though the teleporter scrubbed my teeth, cut out my appendix, pulled out wisdom teeth and failed to remake the content of my intestines. Why should I care about the soul?

How can we prove the copy is thinking the same thoughts?

I mean, I think the concept is generally philosophical masturbation, but consciousness isn't something mystical just because we don't understand what generates it and the rules that govern it. It's just an unexplained phenomenon. Following that, is it unreasonable to want to have a better understanding of the subject before undergoing something that presumably involves the cessation and then regeneration of your consciousness? Which is to say, how can we be sure that your consciousness has remained intact?

Of course, whether or not that matters is subjective.