Check this out:
From:
2006-12-11
¶10. (C) Comment: Garcia Luna has been a trusted liaison,
partner and friend of the FBI since his days at the PFP. He
is a "big picture guy" and strategist, approaching issues and
problems like the engineer that he is. His personal
reputation is very good, however that of some of his
underlings has not been as favorable. Embassy interlocutors
describe Garcia Luna's personality as intense. His Spanish
is often mumbled and spoken at a staccato rate and hard to
understand even for native speakers; his English capabilities
are negligible. His attitude toward the U.S. is friendly.
¶11. (C) Comment continued: Garcia Luna and Medina Mora are
close personally and politically. Having both of them at the
top of the civilian security structure should help maintain
the excellent cooperation that the USG law enforcement
agencies enjoyed with the Fox administration. Both men have
been strong advocates of the need for significant
restructuring of the federal police structure; Garcia Luna
even wrote a book about it. End Comment.
2007-02-27
¶2. (SBU) Medina Mora opened by outlining the legal changes
the Calderon administration would seek from the Mexican
Congress to improve the link between policing,
investigations, and prosecution. First, he said, President
Calderon would seek a constitutional amendment to give a
reorganized federal police force the power to conduct
criminal investigations. Every federal police officer should
have the capacity to conduct investigations without prior
approval from the Office of the Attorney General (PGR), as is
now required. His office would still need to validate the
results of such investigations, but he expected his officers
in the future to focus on building legal cases rather than
"chasing bad guys." Chasing bad guys is a police function,
he said.
¶3. (SBU) Second, he said, he expected Mexico to move toward
a mixed system of oral trials and the current accusatorial
system of justice. Without outlining a time frame or
legislative strategy to effect the change, Medina Mora said
the PGR would seek to institute oral trials at the federal
level for "minor" crimes, retaining accusatorial procedures
for major criminal cases, particularly against the cartels.
However, under the reforms outlined above, his office would
have a strengthened capability to develop and present
evidence to judges for processing major criminal cases.
Embassy comment: There is something inconsistent across
these plans on justice reform. But then the legal package is
still being developed. End comment.
¶4. (SBU) Finally, Medina Mora noted that he wanted to bring
all of Mexico under single criminal and procedural codes at
the federal and state levels.
Then 2008-11-25
¶1. (C) Summary. The Calderon administration's
anti-corruption initiative Operation Cleanup most recently
produced the arrest of the head of Interpol in Mexico and a
former Deputy Attorney General/anti-drug czar. While the
revelations of narco-infiltration into the upper echelons of
law enforcement community have given rise to alarm in public
circles, they also help Calderon burnish his credentials as a
leader committed to combating organized crime and corruption
-- an effect that may come more into view over the longer
term. The only real loser may be Secretary of Public
Security Genaro Garcia Luna, who will have to work hard to
overcome the perception that he is either oblivious to what
goes on around him or tolerates his subordinates' activities.
End Summary.
Then: 2009-10-27
¶1. (C) Summary. With his resignation on September 8, Mexican
Attorney General (AG) Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza leaves a
two-fold legacy. His tenure in office was very positive for
the USG, as he forged a solid relationship with us, offered
full support on high-level extradition cases, and laid the
groundwork for future bilateral cooperation. He was clearly
committed to cracking down on Mexico's drug cartels and took
a strong stand on high-level corruption within his
institution. Notwithstanding his considerable achievements,
he lacked the political heft and possibly the institutional
vision necessary to transform fully the Attorney General's
Office (PGR) and make significant advances on crucial justice
reform issues. His modest record of convictions of thousands
arrested on drug-related charges, and his reservations with
regard to the more aggressive use of his office, clearly
contributed to Calderon's decision to replace him. Medina
Mora's biggest failure may have been his inability to
overcome the deep personal animosity he had with Secretary
Garcia Luna of the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), a
source of additional tension between the PGR and the SSP that
undermined Mexico's counternarcotics effort and complicated
our Merida Initiative programming. End Summary.
What forced Medina out is what I'd like to know.
Now:
http://www.markthetruth.com/america/856-usa-main-arms-supplier-of-mexican-drug-cartels.htmlhttp://www.martialtalk.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-95521.htmlhttp://www.wikileaks.nl/cable/2009/10/09MEXICO3114.htmlAlso from:
¶9. (SBU) The Attorney General suggested shifting U.S.
Halcon Citations to Guatemala, since, he averred, airborne
shipments of illegal drugs within Mexico toward the north
were rare. Similarly, Mora staffer Oscar Rocha outlined a
proposal whereby the U.S. would purchase go-fasts seized and
re-furbished by Mexico and provide them to Central American
governments for their own interdiction efforts.. Providing
them a shore-based interdiction capability they currently
lack would compliment U.S. blue water patrols in the region
and get buy-in from the Centrals for a regional counter-drug
effort. Without providing encouragement to these specific
proposals, Secretary Chertoff agreed the situation warranted
creative approaches and promised to work the inter-agency
community in Washington to see what kinds of resources
various elements, such as DOD, might be able to put into the
mix.
From:
Alberto Islas, a security consultant who advises the Mexican government, says the drug cartels are using the Guatemalan border to move black market weapons. Some are left over from the Central American wars the United States helped fight; others, like the grenades and launchers, are South Korean, Israeli and Spanish. Some were legally supplied to the Mexican government; others were sold by corrupt military officers or officials.
According to State Department documents, in 2009 Mexico bought nearly $177 million worth of American-made weapons, exceeding sales to Iraq and Afghanistan. That number includes $20 million in semi- and fully automatic weapons.
"Most of the M16s were sold legally to the Mexican government and disappeared," Kartchner added.
State Department cables obtained by WikiLeaks confirm that fear. One cable from November 2009 reads "U.S. law enforcement has fair reason to worry a number of weapons simply disappear... "
Another from June 2009 says, "Rogue elements of the Guatemalan military are selling weapons to narcos."
Does this mean that corrupted parts of the US intelligence community are running a black market arms trade by arming both sides of a conflict started by George W.'s puppet Mexican Presidente?
Does the current war remind you of this?
http://www.wikileaks.nl/cable/2008/04/08MEXICO1248.html
Author
Topic: Patriot Act extended (Read 5613 times)