Once again, this is bordering on being more logic than maths, but here it is anyway.
I've been doing a lot of pondering about the various fundamental definitions and properties of mathematical structures, and of course paradoxes have come up. Take, for example, russel's paradox. For those of you who are unfamiliar with russel's paradox, it is a such:
Let us call Russel's set the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. That is, if any set is not a member of itself, it is a member of Russel's set. The paradox arises when you consider whether Russel's set is a member of itself.
Now, this contradiction fouls up naive set theory, and we therefore have lots of different and complicated forms of set theory and logic, like morse-kelley and ZMF, which are been constructed so paradoxes like the above do not occur. However, this seems to be a bit of an unnescessary complication. The problem with naive set theory is that its domain of discourse (that is, the collection of all objects which we are considering and applying logic to) is all sets, which includes Russel's set. Why can we not just define an improved domain of discourse to be all sets which do not reult in a paradox?
Of course, we will have to carefully define what a paradox is. So, for the purposes of this post, we will say that:
-A logical system is called "paradoxical" if, by working within that logical system, it is possible to deduce that some statement within the system is not true xor false (Where xor is the exclusive or. That is, it is possible to deduce that some statement is both true and false, or neither true nor false).
-Similarly, we say a logical system is "not paradoxical" if it is not a paradoxical logical system.
-Within a paradoxical logical system, we say that a subset of that logical system is a paradox if, when removed from that logical system, the paradoxical logical system becomes not paradoxical.
-Similarly, within the context of a not paradoxical logical system, we call any logical object a paradox if including it in the logical system results in a paradoxical logical system.
This concept, although it may seem like cheating somewhat, is not entirely unfamiliar. Indeed, proofs by contradiction are a common thing in maths, and they work of the assumption that the logical system does not contain any paradoxes. In the majority of maths, the lack of paradoxes is not questioned, but at the fundamental level it is seemingly abandoned.
However, this arises another question: can you prove that something does not result in a paradox? Within a finite logical system, a proof by exhaustion would be possible, but how can one extend this to an infinite logical system, such as the natural numbers?