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[Bauglir]

Of course they're not equally reasonable. Neither are they equal to different degrees. We have no evidence or proof of any of them, nor any known situations to compare them to. Their probabilities are undefined, is the point.

Then I am asking, why are they not equally reasonable?   The probabilities are undefined, of course, I am arguing that human intuition about undefined probability has a role in our belief.  If we cannot measure that which cannot be measured, then how can we call one more reasonable than another?  Clearly there is reason to believe in their possible existence by the mere fact they are possible, so then why aren't my dwarf fortress unicorn gods equally reasonable as a single, divine creator?

They might be. I can't know whether they are or not, that's the point. Intuitively, they seem to be less so, but surely you don't suggest we attempt to make this debate about unquantifiable intuitive decisions to which logic cannot be applied.

[Kebooo]

Of course they're not equally reasonable. Neither are they equal to different degrees. We have no evidence or proof of any of them, nor any known situations to compare them to. Their probabilities are undefined, is the point.

Then I am asking, why are they not equally reasonable?   The probabilities are undefined, of course, I am arguing that human intuition about undefined probability has a role in our belief.  If we cannot measure that which cannot be measured, then how can we call one more reasonable than another?  Clearly there is reason to believe in their possible existence by the mere fact they are possible, so then why aren't my dwarf fortress unicorn gods equally reasonable as a single, divine creator?

They might be. I can't know whether they are or not, that's the point. Intuitively, they seem to be less so, but surely you don't suggest we attempt to make this debate about unquantifiable intuitive decisions to which logic cannot be applied.

You said of course they're not equally reasonable.  By the mere fact of their possibility, the level of their "reasonableness" wouldn't be zero and wouldn't be infinite.  If there are an infinite number of divine possibilities, and no way to measure which one is true, then we must not view the possibility of any of them as more or less reasonable than the infinite other possibilities. 

[Bauglir]

Of course they're not equally reasonable. Neither are they equal to different degrees. We have no evidence or proof of any of them, nor any known situations to compare them to. Their probabilities are undefined, is the point.

Then I am asking, why are they not equally reasonable?   The probabilities are undefined, of course, I am arguing that human intuition about undefined probability has a role in our belief.  If we cannot measure that which cannot be measured, then how can we call one more reasonable than another?  Clearly there is reason to believe in their possible existence by the mere fact they are possible, so then why aren't my dwarf fortress unicorn gods equally reasonable as a single, divine creator?

They might be. I can't know whether they are or not, that's the point. Intuitively, they seem to be less so, but surely you don't suggest we attempt to make this debate about unquantifiable intuitive decisions to which logic cannot be applied.

You said of course they're not equally reasonable.  By the mere fact of their possibility, the level of their "reasonableness" wouldn't be zero and wouldn't be infinite.  If there are an infinite number of divine possibilities, and no way to measure which one is true, then we must not view the possibility of any of them as more or less reasonable than the infinite other possibilities.

Their probabilities can't be said to be equal OR different. I don't know why you're assuming that. We can say NOTHING about the probabilities. We can't say that any possibility is more or less or equally reasonable than the infinite other possibilities.

[Andir]

I'll admit to be not following as close as I should be, but is he trying to say that because infinite possibilities exist that must mean one of those has a chance of being probable?

Isn't that like saying you have a warehouse full of peanuts and assuming that the marble you believe is in the corner is more probable than the fact that there's no proof of a marble being there.

[Kebooo]

Of course they're not equally reasonable. Neither are they equal to different degrees. We have no evidence or proof of any of them, nor any known situations to compare them to. Their probabilities are undefined, is the point.

Then I am asking, why are they not equally reasonable?   The probabilities are undefined, of course, I am arguing that human intuition about undefined probability has a role in our belief.  If we cannot measure that which cannot be measured, then how can we call one more reasonable than another?  Clearly there is reason to believe in their possible existence by the mere fact they are possible, so then why aren't my dwarf fortress unicorn gods equally reasonable as a single, divine creator?

They might be. I can't know whether they are or not, that's the point. Intuitively, they seem to be less so, but surely you don't suggest we attempt to make this debate about unquantifiable intuitive decisions to which logic cannot be applied.

You said of course they're not equally reasonable.  By the mere fact of their possibility, the level of their "reasonableness" wouldn't be zero and wouldn't be infinite.  If there are an infinite number of divine possibilities, and no way to measure which one is true, then we must not view the possibility of any of them as more or less reasonable than the infinite other possibilities.

Their probabilities can't be said to be equal OR different. I don't know why you're assuming that. We can say NOTHING about the probabilities. We can't say that any possibility is more or less or equally reasonable than the infinite other possibilities.

I'm not saying their probabilities are equal or different or that we even have to have the capability of measuring their probability.  I wouldn't even say probability is a consistent way of determining truth in our reality, either.  I'm talking about the reasonableness of their possibility.  Since we know they are definitely ALL possible, because that is what everyone in this topic is arguing, but do not have any way to measure whether they are true or not, then there is nothing to substantiate the idea one's POSSIBILITY is more or less reasonable than the other, by default, their possibilities are equally reasonable, logically, not the probability.  They can't simply be none of those or else the reasonableness of their existence is undefined, and so it would be a concept not worth discussing or expressing belief or disbelief in because it couldn't be objectively discussed with language or logic. 

[Kebooo]

I'll admit to be not following as close as I should be, but is he trying to say that because infinite possibilities exist that must mean one of those has a chance of being probable?

Isn't that like saying you have a warehouse full of peanuts and assuming that the marble you believe is in the corner is more probable than the fact that there's no proof of a marble being there.

No, I am saying since infinite possibilities exist, and we have no way to directly measure how reasonable or plausible their existence is, for us, they would logically be all equally reasonable from our perspective.  But most people tend not to feel that way about it.

[Bauglir]

Well, how does that do anything but support the agnostic position? You started this whole thing off by asking why agnostics don't say they disbelieve in God, but say they don't believe in God. Your conclusion here seems to be that that is the logically correct way to go.

Also, I'm not at all certain what you mean by the reasonableness of the probabilities or the possibilities or whatever. Reasonable is shorthand for "I find this intuitively probable, or at least not improbable". If we're using intuition as the basis for our argument, we're done. It comes down to individual quirks and has nothing to do with logic. If we're talking about logic, we're talking about probabilities.

[Kebooo]

I am saying agnostics that argue against believing god does not exist cannot positively believe in anything (besides, perhaps, logic itself), or that they can find the idea that I created the universe then inserted myself into it any less reasonable than the idea of one divine creator.  Nor could they find either of those more reasonable than the idea of hybrid monkey/unicorn/gremlins riding on santa sleighs and rotating around football players while rolling down mountains and drinking pepsi to be the form our divine creator.  Basically, I am forcing them to take the ultimate agnostic position in all things, there is no reason for them to positively believe anything if they do not have absolute proof of anything.  But, by the nature of these positions, they could not say "I know for certain we cannot know." and so they should exclude themselves from taking a position or arguing it because it contradicts itself, no?  What they are really saying is "I believe we cannot know, based on my assumptions", then many call it stupid or moronic to take a positive belief.  I hope I have sufficiently explained this, I can elaborate further if necessary.

My ultimate point?  We do, and should have positive beliefs that are not based on the existence of absolute evidence or even any evidence at all (believing you're one person typing at that PC without any evidence provided or any claim even made, I simply assume it to be true).  If we go by pure logic itself, then we should not positively believe anything, so what is the purpose of the word?  It would be better to say we cannot positively know anything.  I do not know god does not exist.  I believe he does not.

[Andir]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

[Kebooo]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

If it is not impossible, then it is possible.  So yes, you should believe in its possibility, of course.  What if there is a blue one? It's possible.  But I would believe they are not there.  Would I believe they are not possible?  No.

[Andir]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

If it is not impossible, then it is possible.  So yes, you should believe in its possibility, of course.  What if there is a blue one? It's possible.  But I would believe they are not there.  Would I believe they are not possible?  No.

But you're concentrating on the edge cases... the majority of the warehouse is white peanuts and you're holding out for the possibility that one exist of a different color, even though nobody has seen it?

[Kebooo]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

If it is not impossible, then it is possible.  So yes, you should believe in its possibility, of course.  What if there is a blue one? It's possible.  But I would believe they are not there.  Would I believe they are not possible?  No.

But you're concentrating on the edge cases... the majority of the warehouse is white peanuts and you're holding out for the possibility that one exist of a different color, even though nobody has seen it?

Are you saying it's impossible?  Are you certain it is impossible?  If it is not impossible, then you must admit it is possible.  Plus, this is different than what I am saying anyway (to some extent).  You are using your eyes to try go gauge reasonableness.  How are we to gauge the reasonableness of something we cannot measure?  But, on some level, the infinite possibilities of divinity are based in reason by the mere possibility of their existence.

[Andir]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

If it is not impossible, then it is possible.  So yes, you should believe in its possibility, of course.  What if there is a blue one? It's possible.  But I would believe they are not there.  Would I believe they are not possible?  No.

But you're concentrating on the edge cases... the majority of the warehouse is white peanuts and you're holding out for the possibility that one exist of a different color, even though nobody has seen it?

Are you saying it's impossible?  Are you certain it is impossible?  If it is not impossible, then you must admit it is possible.  Plus, this is different than what I am saying anyway (to some extent).  You are using your eyes to try go gauge reasonableness.  How are we to gauge the reasonableness of something we cannot measure?  But, on some level, the infinite possibilities of divinity are based in reason by the mere possibility of their existence.

No, I'm saying that I've never seen, felt, heard, etc. a god, so the reasonable answer is that it doesn't exist.  A person standing next to you says you can have all the white peanuts or you can have the single red one that might be there.  It's not reasonable to look at a room full of white peanuts and turn to the person next to you and ask for the red one that is possibly not there.

It's more logical to assume the red one doesn't even exist.

[Belathus]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

If it is not impossible, then it is possible.  So yes, you should believe in its possibility, of course.  What if there is a blue one? It's possible.  But I would believe they are not there.  Would I believe they are not possible?  No.

But you're concentrating on the edge cases... the majority of the warehouse is white peanuts and you're holding out for the possibility that one exist of a different color, even though nobody has seen it?

This reminds me of the teapot argument.  "There is a teapot orbiting the Sun somewhere between Earth and Mars.  Though, I can't prove it, you can't disprove it either."  It is pointless to assume the statement is true, because the odds are highly unlikely (unlike the blue/red styrofoam peanut).  And, coincidently, that happens to be my stance on God.

[Kebooo]

But lets say we have that warehouse full of packing peanuts... There is a fan blowing these all over the warehouse.
All of them we can see are white.  You come along and say, "There's a possibility that there's a red one in there."  We should just believe that because you say it's there?  What if there's a single blue one in there instead?

If it is not impossible, then it is possible.  So yes, you should believe in its possibility, of course.  What if there is a blue one? It's possible.  But I would believe they are not there.  Would I believe they are not possible?  No.

But you're concentrating on the edge cases... the majority of the warehouse is white peanuts and you're holding out for the possibility that one exist of a different color, even though nobody has seen it?

Are you saying it's impossible?  Are you certain it is impossible?  If it is not impossible, then you must admit it is possible.  Plus, this is different than what I am saying anyway (to some extent).  You are using your eyes to try go gauge reasonableness.  How are we to gauge the reasonableness of something we cannot measure?  But, on some level, the infinite possibilities of divinity are based in reason by the mere possibility of their existence.

No, I'm saying that I've never seen, felt, heard, etc. a god, so the reasonable answer is that it doesn't exist.  A person standing next to you says you can have all the white peanuts or you can have the single red one that might be there.  It's not reasonable to look at a room full of white peanuts and turn to the person next to you and ask for the red one that is possibly not there.

It's more logical to assume the red one doesn't even exist.

I agree with you.  I believe the red peanut is not there, and I believe god does not exist.  But I admit both are possible and that neither has been proven impossible.  I think you're misinterpreting why I am arguing what I am arguing.  I am simply trying to refute the notion that it is unreasonable, stupid, or some other such characterization to positively believe god does not exist.  But that claim of theirs cannot be a positive belief or statement of fact by their own logic (because of the inherent doubt in all of their reality).  They are basically saying "I believe you cannot know" and stating it matter-of-factly.  But suppose I am divine and just hiding it.  How do they know I don't know?  They can't.  So why are they even bothering to argue it?  I'm just trying to point out the inherent contradiction in the point of arguing in favor of pure agnosticism.  How can they know I don't know when they don't have absolute evidence I am not divine?