If you want my rather profunctory opinion, defence-in-depth vs. offence-in-depth still overwhelmingly applies to any field of conflict (and offence vs. offence, ditto both, when it's not really clear which way it's flowing/its ebbing and flowing for each).
There are very few "one trick pony is all you need"s in warfare. Roadside IEDs may represent a major and quite awkward threat to conventional forces in assymetrical warfare, but the forces employing them need to have guys with AK47s willing to put the oar in. Air-power may make for a useful tool to extend naval operations, but you still need the other ship-types. Even in the age of nukes, and potential MAD, there was still necessary thought as to how (surviving) forces would operate between and beyond the nuclear exchanges.
Agincourt didn't actually make knights obselete (arguably, through iterations of gradual change in armour levels/types, the horse-charge survived until at least WW2 - and I have an inkling even later) and Russian hypersonic missiles clearly aren't preventing the need for hand-to-hand trench fighting. Balances may change, but 'new' elements to warfare are wedges, gradually adjusting the effectiveness of a particular leg to any given combat scenario.
And USVs, via various tos-and-fros in popularity, practicality and implementation are clearly the latest iteration of what started(?) in antiquity as the Fire Ship. A bit more subtle than a burning hulk, bit more long ranged than a torpedo and a bit more 'humanitarian' to its operators than the Kaiten of the Japanese. An amount of cross-polination between other platforms (guided missiles, in the air, the Goliath Tank-like solutions for the ground) and more ad-hoc solutions. Definitely very effective. Doesn't render an otherwise conventional navy obsolete, especially with the presumed failure rate[1], but useful. Expect to see more examples of this generation of the meme be deployed[2] by others, now that it has shown itself as a mature (or at least very capable adescent) example of this generation of the concept.
Darnit. This was supposed to be a quick pointing out of the "-in-depth" importance, but I drifted around quite a lot. I cut a few of my example paragraphs, as overkill, perhaps ought to have cut more/differently/all of it.
[1] Loss of success, more than waste of resources, I think it might be best to think of it - given that it seems 'easy' enough just to try again with the next produced units - though obviously it is a finite resource with replenishment limits.... But, as it is clearly effective enough to worry the Russians, like most(/all?) military elements even the failures (or the mere possibility of being out there, even when it isn't) serve a tactical purpose of their own.
[2] Surprised not to have seen whatever-the-Russians-have-had, yet, as their own pre-conflict speculative arms development. Someone in every major military power (and probably minor, and likely a number of non-state-actors) will have considered something of parity/equivalence. Amazing that 'any missile, of any generation they have' is being sent against Ukraine but the similar can't be said for the maritime domain. The lack of them is quite interesting, in fact, whichever one(s) of the (at least) three separate reasons it might be down to, that immediately come to mind.