The Garin Bicycle Gun
The development of our new weapon shall start with the adaptation of the Emu to our production line, renamed as the Tūn NMG and patented as Toskeshian property.
After we accomplish that necessary step, we will begin the development of our new weapon, the Garian Bicycle Gun. It consists on a modified Emu Tūn NMG in which the crank mechanism has been moved down and transformed into clipless pedals, similar to the ones in a bicycle, so the gunner can better aim and handle the recoil of the gun with both of his hands, improving accuracy. It also has the added benefit of allowing a higher speed of revolution because of the improved leg strength in comparison with the arm´s.
Further modification of the weapon includes a multibarrel design and usage of 20 mm rounds, tightly stored in order to reduce occupied space. A miniaturized electric motor helps the gunner, multiplying his efforts and ensuring he can restart the spin of the gun in no time.
Additional features:
Gears, which limit the maximum projectiles fired per minute to 1,500, 3,000 ,4,500 and 6,000 depending on the user choice.
Hard AP rounds, contained in a capped “soft” round with and streamlined cover increasing accuracy, penetration and reducing in-flight loss of velocity. Designed to be a machine gun round adaptation of the armour-piercing capped ballistic cap (APCBC) and compatible with the smaller caliber Tūn NMG.
The GBG is designed to be deployed either in fixed positions, as a secondary weapon for our Hexapods, in our Qui Chus so they can serve as a sort of AA platform and finally as front turret for our assault helicopters.
This is the proposed revision for this turn.
Now, I would like to argue for the advantages that having my radio would present:
1- Neutralization of enemy artillery, as observers won´t be able to relay orders to them. Important in the Fjords, where their naval bombings won´t be as useful.
2- Will mess up with their massed assaults, especially in the Badlands and Fjords, as they won´t be able to exploit weak points in our defenses before we correct them, or
3- Won´t be able to call helis for close air support or bombing runs at our artillery emplacements.
4- Less flexible battle plans. If anything goes wrong, they won´t be able to successfully improvise.
5- More effective soldiers under enemy lines, since their presence can´t be communicated as quickly.
6-Posibility of making they waste a turn by putting deploying additional trasnmitters a turn later.
7- We will be able to communicate all along, allowing us to concentrate our forces effectively