I still highly recommned everybody reads this.
Its not that objective, and most of its arguments centre around the fact that "its OK for us to do it as others do it too..." which is a weak argument, as whoever wrote it would have to accept that everyone else doing it is OK for the questionable actions to be OK - it almost accepts that what is going on is wrong. So, is it OK for me to criticize the conduct of the elections in Crimea in the same way I have criticized the US influence in Iraq/Afghanistan? By this documents logic, I sure can.
Indeed. It also neglects that the presence of Russian armed troops alone is worsened by their actions taken during the lead-up to the referendum in order to indirectly influence the results, as opposed the US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, who left so quickly they didn't even leave dust on their boots in large part
because the governments voted in refused to accept US soldiers in their nations for any longer than they had to (look at the failed negotiations surrounding the security agreements with both). If the goal was to rig the elections to provide for pro-West governments in both nations, then the rigging was arguably the most incompetent thing we've seen come out of the Bush administration.
Also, it's at the best incorrect about the referendum being invalidated if less than 50% of the population actually - no such restriction was emplaced. It entirely ignores the actual reasoning between the "yes/yes" argument; the entire key to it was that the autonomy would include powers of independent diplomatic relations being vested in the Rada, which had been reduced to a drastically pro-Russian rump by appointment. In other words, said autonomy would grant the Rada the right to immediately vote through a resolution requesting annexation to Russia.
There were plenty of ways for Russia to hold a proper referendum in Crimea; they ignored each and every one to get the travesty we saw, because the political goals of Putin did not permit any other outcome than "yes".
It didn't really matter because the general public opinion was pro-Russian way before that. Besides, media superiority does not a vote unfair make, otherwise, most votes in the modern world would be unfair.
Hence my point that the Crimean annexation was opposed by the West not due to moral concerns, but due to political ones. I am not saying it was a nice thing to do in a vacuum (irredentism is a very, very dangerous thing, if we accept it as an valid reasoning for changing borders, the world is pretty much screwed), I am saying it was a perfectly normal thing to do as far as modern Realpolitik goes.
The argument isn't that media superiority makes the vote unfair. The argument is that media superiority obtained as part of a campaign of threats and intimidation through military superiority makes the vote unfair. Also, and it's critical to note, it is not a
normal thing to do; hence the outrage that was directed against the US invasion of Iraq, and the outrage that is presently being directed against Russia. Both were a violation of the status quo of peaceful negotiation and at most, the indirect fighting of war through economic means (sanctions, etc.), and both were rightfully opposed by much of Europe. There's a reason Bush had to come up with his silly little "Coalition of the Willing"; he needed a PR schtick to give the invasion a veneer of legitimacy, and one that was not bought by many. It was a normal thing maybe half a century ago, but the perception of world relations changed in 1991, and in PR and diplomacy alike, perception is everything. That isn't always fair (look at people quietly shuffling Africa under the carpet), but it's not realpolitik alone that is causing the concern.
Heck, if it was realpolitik alone that governed matters, Iraq would never have happened. Iraq was the culmination of neo-con and paleo-con ideology surrounding the liberalization of the world through the spread of democracy through whatever means necessary. It was as ideological as the 19th-century concept of pan-Slavism or the Drang nach Osten.