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[Sean Mirrsen]

From my multiverse-observer standpoint, there is a clear difference between two people sharing memories and personalities, and one person dying and reviving, including one person being cloned.

It all comes down to energy states and patterns. Much like "teleportation" can be achieved by making the universe believe that, on a quantum level, two distant locations might as well be the same point in space, so can thought be interchanged between two sufficiently similar energy patterns that are colloquially referred to as "souls". A "soul" is basically an imprint of a person's energy states and the patterns formed by the various energies of the mind and body, on the ambient energy background of the universe. It contains, by its nature, much the same information that a human's brain has access to, but isn't necessarily absolutely unique, even between twins - as they come into contact with the rest of the world at different times, and have the meta-feedback-loop of observing the actions of their identical twin, the stimuli that affect them are minutely different, and the subtle influences stemming even from such a simple thing as identifying by a given name, make them sufficiently different to the universe that normally they would not experience anything out of the ordinary. However, in some cases it is possible that identical twins may, by accident or on purpose, become "sufficiently similar" to the universe, allowing their individual energy patterns to co-react regardless of their relative location. Psychic phenomena of all kinds have the same basic operating principle, but rely on different means to stimulate the target individuals into a "sufficiantly similar" state, be it sound patterns, chemical combinations, or more advanced forms of "falling in step" with another person. Personal "ties" like love are founded in the same basic principle.

What this means in general, is that unless they have absolutely identical stimuli throughout their entire life, two identical clones will be at least sufficiently different not to have personality confusion crop up, and functionally they are each a separate person. A revived Grate corpse and a living respawned Grate would be two different people. The "soul" in this viewpoint is nothing but the result of a person's existence, much like light is the result of a lightbulb being turned on.

However, let's circle back to the origin of the effect. Grate is that way because the universe "resets" him when his pattern ceases to exist, effectively enforcing the existence of "a" Grate. This Grate is always one and the same Grate - a replica of the one who originally died. Each replica starts from the same state and pattern, and is only modified by its surroundings and external stimuli, much like identical twins. I suspect that, much like identical twins, if a Grate were to be revived, nothing of interest would happen unless the two Grates tried to telepathically communicate, in which case it could theoretically work - by sheer power of quantum entanglement. Also, I rather suspect that the respawn effect would not kick in until ALL Grates were dead. And.. that's about it, really.

Just tossing an alternative interpretation out there. May or may not make sense, and/or cause spontaneous brain-boiling.

[Xantalos]

Well, the only other way would be to quote the quote you want to reference a bunch of times and then pare it down each time, which is way too inefficient to use.

[GreatWyrmGold]

It all comes down to energy states and patterns...

This argument seems to remind me of those arguments that the identity is based more on the physical body than the mind. I disagree with that line of argumentation for reasons I'm willing to outline again if you want.

Well, the only other way would be to quote the quote you want to reference a bunch of times and then pare it down each time, which is way too inefficient to use.

Or...quote it once, insert quote tags in the middle.
Which is what I do, so it's definitely possible.

[Sean Mirrsen]

It all comes down to energy states and patterns...

This argument seems to remind me of those arguments that the identity is based more on the physical body than the mind. I disagree with that line of argumentation for reasons I'm willing to outline again if you want.

You can just link to them if you have them outlined elsewhere.

[Xantalos]

...
Oh wait, you type your brackets. 

[Harry Baldman]

@GWG: Okay then, let me put it to you this way - define the concept of being. I hope what I meant by the integral nature of identity becomes clearer. Another question as well. Are two beings with the same identity interchangeable? If so, would you say you are interchangeable with the you of tomorrow? Or the you of next week? Or the you of ten years from now or in the past? And if they are not interchangeable, what makes you say that? Also, do you believe the human mind and personality to be an entity independent of the body?

[Parisbre56]

@Harry Baldman: It's very simple. If you consider your twin brother to be you, then for you, he is you, because that is the label your programming assigns to him. Assuming there is no god, no perfect observer, then there can be no true objective authority on who is you. We can use legal arguments (you is whoever has got identification papers proving they are you that can hold in court) or common opinions (you is whoever others think you is) to define you in some more generally acceptable way, but in the end the matter would still be subjective, a result of the programming we have inherited from our biology and our environment.

What if Group A perceives you as one thing, Group B thinks you're something else, Group C believes you to be another thing entirely, and you don't have any opinion at all on who you are due to devoting no thought to it? What is your identity in that case? Can you have no identity?

I like to think of humans as machines or programs because it makes things easier, at least for me. I don't know if there's a name for my broader way of thinking. Functional? Realistic? Solipsism? Not really sure.

Anyway, in that case, the variable identity would not exist for you, you would not have it in your programming.

Or you would have a pointer named identity pointing to an array. That array would hold pointers to all the known identity data with yours in the first place. So the first place of the array would be empty (null pointer) and the next places would hold the identities those groups have given you, if you know about that.

Or you could imagine identity as a function that is given an object as input and returns that object's identity data as output. So for that human, that function would never be called with himself as input. If however someone else were to run that function and give the NoSelfIdentity person as input then they would gain whatever identity they hold for him.

Really, it's a very subjective question, depending on how that man and the other men think exactly. And it is also dependent on biological stuff that I don't know about. I mean, it seems like you're asking me to tell you how the human brain functions exactly and even biologists can't do that yet. I can just give you the closest thing I can come up with using my logic and my axioms.

Of course, that assumes that the human has no identity for some reason, which is a very rare thing (I think, I don't remember the name of the disorder right now). Most humans (at least that is what I believe, I haven't conducted any studies on the frequencies of such disorders) are programmed by their biology and their environment (parents, society, experience, etc.) to identify themselves as something, to have at least one little label with the word me in their head, to make a story for themselves, to be able to look at themselves in the mirror and say "Hey, that's me!". They also usually do the same thing for most of the objects they perceive, be they animate or inanimate, sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously.

Irrelevant: Here's a good article related to the subject of identity. I don't fully agree with it but it raises some good points.

Now to see how my action turned out in the mission because I just got a notification e-mail. Here's hoping it went well...

[Sean Mirrsen]

@Harry Baldman: Is the question a matter of being able to describe the concept of identity, or the concept of existence (i.e., "being")? Furthermore, is it a matter of describing it in principle, or describing it with language? There is no limit to the capacity of thought - it's the language that lacks the capacity to describe concepts for which no terms have been defined.

[syvarris]

Gaaah, I can't keep pace with this anymore.  Silly me, taking a break...

This is kind of outdated, because I answer posts as I read them.

Point to where you've given an explanation as to what makes the changes a clone experiences different from the ones the "real" person experiences.

I never did.  I said that the original's death was the final thing that happened to the original.  It ended.  There's a copy that's identical, but the original ended.

Well, here's a question. How do you determine "continuity of brain function"? After all, the clone's brain will also be as convinced as to the continuity of its function. Think of it like the Game of Life. The brain acts in certain ways, largely because of the initial starting conditions. However, you can't tell if the game started two turns ago or 50 turns ago. So...Alright, let me put it another way. Why does "continuity of brain function" matter so much? It doesn't actually affect anything.

You don't.  It's impossible to really determine if anything in the past really happened.  I thought you were the one that said using that as an argument was cheating? 

And it doesn't; if it did, I wouldn't have said that the argument is completely irrelevant for all intents and purposes. :I

You really haven't. You've basically said "The clone is a different person because of the changes he's experienced, so he's a different person from the original."

Again with the putting words in my mouth.  Can't you deconstruct my argument without resorting to strawmen?

Differences in their minds. Person A has a certain set of experiences, memories, skills, personality traits, etc. Person B has a different set of the same.

Okay then.  I don't remember anything from when I was three.  Am I not the same person, because I have a completely different set of memories?

What if an old man develops alzheimer's?  Does he become a different person?  If he used to be my father, is he not my father now?

How about me six months ago?  I must have had some memories I don't have now- I can't remember what I had for breakfast January 17th for example.  Plus I have new memories.  And my personality has changed somewhat over that time.  Was I a different person before those changes?

Why is life good? Why is stealing bad? A few things, we just need to have as axioms.

Yes, that was my point.  Thanks for illustrating it for me~!


@Paris
I don't feel like going back and finding your post, but I can say that I believe there could be multiple 'you's.  They'd diverge pretty quick, but they would be the same person for a time, if you could have both minds experience the same stuff while they split.


@Harry
Well said.  I pretty much agree with all that, except I find it fun to argue.

I don't consider twins to be the same person, because they started off as different thinking entities, and only diverged further from there.  Twins are pretty different people.


And I kinda did define 'death' as when your whole nervous system ceases to function.

a creature 'dying' (brain completely ceasing to function)

Okay, I said brain, but I don't consider the bits that carry orders to your legs to be important for it.

[Parisbre56]

@syvarris: Ah, well done then, you have a good system of axioms it seems. Although I'd swear you had said something different... Oh well, too lazy to go back and check.

* Parisbre56 is feeling slightly frustrated with the lack of progress for Team A in the mission...

[Sean Mirrsen]

You don't.  It's impossible to really determine if anything in the past really happened.  I thought you were the one that said using that as an argument was cheating?

Prove that something in the past really happened? Easy peasy. Requires a bit of infrastructure and technology, but you can observe events of the past constantly due to light lag. If you had a mirror bounce the reflected light at a place some lightyears away, where another mirror would bounce it back, and you had the means to detect and sufficiently amplify the returning light, you could conclusively prove that the event really did happen some few years back, because thanks to light lag, you're literally seeing it happen before your eyes. Again.

Okay then.  I don't remember anything from when I was three.  Am I not the same person, because I have a completely different set of memories? <etc. snip>

You are the same individual, but are not the same person. There is a bit of ontological identity inertia involved, in that an object tends to stay identified as the object it is originally identified as, a long as it can still be identified as that object. So the you now, and the you five minutes from now, are still the same person. And the you a month, a year, or ten years from now, are still by virtue of ontological inertia, the same individual - anyone who had an opportunity to repeatedly identify you as you along that time will still identify you as you.

Now take the you now, and the you thirty years, three changed houses, two marriages, and one car accident from now, and take a person who's only seen the you ten years before now. There is a decent chance that even our human brain's ability to process fuzzy data like that, and the built-in face recognition, will fail as the person will not identify you as you, until you reaffirm your identity.

It's the same problem as that blasted boat I can't remember the name of. With the planks changed one by one. It still remains technically the same boat, by virtue of a single small change not being enough to change the identity of the boat. But even a single small change already makes a different boat, and accumulated changes over time only exacerbate the problem to anyone who has to re-identify the boat as one or the other.

[Harry Baldman]

-viewpoint and a neat article-

That is quite a neat article. I knew there was some use in asking all these questions! Also, sensible answers. Good show, sir.

@Harry Baldman: Is the question a matter of being able to describe the concept of identity, or the concept of existence (i.e., "being")? Furthermore, is it a matter of describing it in principle, or describing it with language? There is no limit to the capacity of thought - it's the language that lacks the capacity to describe concepts for which no terms have been defined.

Can you describe something in principle without language? I don't think that'll quite work over the Internet. Although I'd certainly like to get the peripheral that'd permit it. In any case, I'd like to hear whatever you've got.

[Sean Mirrsen]

Can you describe something in principle without language? I don't think that'll quite work over the Internet. Although I'd certainly like to get the peripheral that'd permit it. In any case, I'd like to hear whatever you've got.

As a native speaker of Russian, communicating a concept is a hurdle I face too many times on the Internet. My brain knows what it wants to say, but there are no words that match. I'll give it a try once my brain starts working again in the morning.

[Harry Baldman]

Oh, you may communicate it in Russian to me through PM if you find that easier. I'll probably understand most of it, too. I tend to have troubles communicating concepts as well, though that's mostly my brain getting ahead of my mouth (hands) or vice versa.

[GreatWyrmGold]

It all comes down to energy states and patterns...

This argument seems to remind me of those arguments that the identity is based more on the physical body than the mind. I disagree with that line of argumentation for reasons I'm willing to outline again if you want.

You can just link to them if you have them outlined elsewhere.

If I can find them, and if they aren't shrouded behind too much else. Or scattered between multiple posts. Or not mentioned because they weren't brought up by any particular argument.
So, here we go.

Spoiler: Reasons (click to show/hide)

1. The physical body is constantly being replaced. Most of the definitions of identity-by-body avoid needing to tread Thaddeus's Paradox by defining the whole as the sum of specific parts--parts which are constantly being replaced! This definition of the self implies a periodic complete replacement of self.
2. Conversely, what happens when the parts split? To pick the most obvious example, the parts that make up a baby come from the mother--is the baby the mother? And don't get me started on food.
3. Above all, the identity-by-body argument implies that the mind is completely unimportant when it comes to determining identity, compared to the physical form. This has all kinds of unpleasant implications, ranging from implied racism to encouraged vanity.

...
Oh wait, you type your brackets.

...
You don't?
Well, there's also a quote button. Highlight the text and hit the button with a speech bubble.

@GWG: Okay then, let me put it to you this way - define the concept of being. I hope what I meant by the integral nature of identity becomes clearer.

Being, physical, or being, as in cognitive?
As to the first, if a thing can be described at any specific point in time by a collection of parts, it either is, was, or will be. If it can be described as a such in the now, it exists currently.
As to the latter...cogito ergo sum. It's not a new thing.

Another question as well. Are two beings with the same identity interchangeable? If so, would you say you are interchangeable with the you of tomorrow? Or the you of next week? Or the you of ten years from now or in the past? And if they are not interchangeable, what makes you say that?

What do you mean by that? If you're asking if they're exactly the same, of course not, but why does that matter?

Also, do you believe the human mind and personality to be an entity independent of the body?

In principle? Probably. In practice? No.

I like to think of humans as machines or programs because it makes things easier, at least for me. I don't know if there's a name for my broader way of thinking. Functional? Realistic? Solipsism? Not really sure.

It reminds me of the old spherical-chicken joke.
It's a model. It's simpler, and it preserves the important basic qualities.

As to your explanation...it's interesting, but strikes me as simplistic. I can't quite place my finger on why, though.

This is kind of outdated, because I answer posts as I read them.

Been there, done that anyways.

Point to where you've given an explanation as to what makes the changes a clone experiences different from the ones the "real" person experiences.

I never did.  I said that the original's death was the final thing that happened to the original.  It ended.  There's a copy that's identical, but the original ended.

Not Grate's clones in specific, clones in general.

You don't.  It's impossible to really determine if anything in the past really happened.  I thought you were the one that said using that as an argument was cheating?

When did I say that?

And it doesn't; if it did, I wouldn't have said that the argument is completely irrelevant for all intents and purposes. :I

...?

You really haven't. You've basically said "The clone is a different person because of the changes he's experienced, so he's a different person from the original."

Again with the putting words in my mouth.  Can't you deconstruct my argument without resorting to strawmen?

That's not a strawman. It's a distillation of your points.
And if you disagree with my interpretation, would you mind providing your own interpretation of your arguments?

Differences in their minds. Person A has a certain set of experiences, memories, skills, personality traits, etc. Person B has a different set of the same.

Okay then.  I don't remember anything from when I was three.  Am I not the same person, because I have a completely different set of memories?

No. First, your experiences from the early years still influence you. Second...identity isn't a point, it's a line. A line that gets fuzzy towards the beginning, but a line nonetheless. It's a line that changes, largely based on what came before. If you tried to take any one point in the line and call it "you," you would be missing the reason and essence of why you are you.

What if an old man develops alzheimer's?  Does he become a different person?  If he used to be my father, is he not my father now?

First off, being "your father" has nothing to do with identity and everything to do with biology. Being "your dad" has to do with you, not him. You being "his son" is what matters to him--and if he doesn't remember you as his son, well...to him, you aren't. It's a bit harsh to say you aren't, and not quite right since there's a bunch of other people involved in that, but...yeah, you get my point.
Secondly, it depends. My mother says that some people with Alzheimers "revert" to an earlier stage in their life, forgetting what came before. In this case, they simply moved to a different point on their identity. In the case of other kinds of brain damage where someone becomes someone completely unlike anything he's ever been? I'd say that that could change you to not be you, yes. You'd be a different person by the same name.

How about me six months ago?  I must have had some memories I don't have now- I can't remember what I had for breakfast January 17th for example.  Plus I have new memories.  And my personality has changed somewhat over that time.  Was I a different person before those changes?

See the "line" explanation above. Assuming you didn't "splinter," you're still you.

Why is life good? Why is stealing bad? A few things, we just need to have as axioms.

Yes, that was my point.  Thanks for illustrating it for me~!

And my point (in various posts, largely against Baldman's arguments) was that this isn't one of those things.
I think. I can't quite remember what your argument I was responding to was.

Can you describe something in principle without language? I don't think that'll quite work over the Internet. Although I'd certainly like to get the peripheral that'd permit it. In any case, I'd like to hear whatever you've got.

As a native speaker of Russian, communicating a concept is a hurdle I face too many times on the Internet. My brain knows what it wants to say, but there are no words that match. I'll give it a try once my brain starts working again in the morning.

Is it that you don't understand English as well, or that English doesn't have words for what you're trying to say? The former seems more likely, but the latter has more interesting implications, so I hope it's true.

Oh, you may communicate it in Russian to me through PM if you find that easier.

Do it in the thread, for all I care.
...Okay, maybe I'm just hoping I can Google Translate something semi-comprehensible and/or amusing out of it.