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[GreatWyrmGold]

Possibly. Or, it's possible that you've never explained it. I'm leaning towards the latter.

Yes we have.  You just disagree with all our explanations.  We don't.  Therefore, there must be something in our heads that ticks to a different tempo.  *shrug*

Point to where you've given an explanation as to what makes the changes a clone experiences different from the ones the "real" person experiences.

No.  You're ignoring what you're quoting again.
I said "completely ceasing to function".  In this instance, the thing that is the person is the function of the brain, not the brain itself.  If you completely break the brain, then rebuild it with the same cells, the person's "different".  If you slowly replace all the cells with quantum supercomputers without ever turning it off, it's the same person.  Hell, replace them with a planet sized computer that uses terrified goblins as transistors.  Still the same guy if you never shut him off or change him too much (a different way of changing who it is ).

Ah. My bad.
Well, here's a question. How do you determine "continuity of brain function"? After all, the clone's brain will also be as convinced as to the continuity of its function. Think of it like the Game of Life. The brain acts in certain ways, largely because of the initial starting conditions. However, you can't tell if the game started two turns ago or 50 turns ago. So...Alright, let me put it another way. Why does "continuity of brain function" matter so much? It doesn't actually affect anything.

Why? Why is the second inherently so different from the first? You've been saying they are, but you've never said why.

I have said why they're different many times.

You really haven't. You've basically said "The clone is a different person because of the changes he's experienced, so he's a different person from the original."

Define "different person".   What seperates two people?

Differences in their minds. Person A has a certain set of experiences, memories, skills, personality traits, etc. Person B has a different set of the same.

Eh, I mindlessly believe in a lot of stuff I can't logically prove.  For example: why is happiness good?

Why is life good? Why is stealing bad? A few things, we just need to have as axioms.
Or, put it another way: A lack of happiness leads to depression, which decreases productivity and ability to philosophize, as well as leading to a higher probability of suicide and hence preventing them from doing anything.

[Parisbre56]

@Paris
Oh, I could easily do the same thing I'm doing with GWG with you.  As I said before, I enjoy pointlessly arguing over semantics.  I just didn't 'cause it seemed to be addressed to Kri.

Want me to?

Eh, I was just joking around, but sure, if you want. Although I don't see how you can refute my point, since if you believe what you said above and we take the argument about the computer-brain I gave Kriellya, then you have basically agreed to the point that there can be two or more "yous" at the same time and I don't think you believe that either. Therefore, either there can be more than two yous at the same time or your definition of you is illogical and needs to be reconsidered.

For the record, I do believe there can be more than one people who are you at the same time, because I believe that you and me are just subjective labels.

[Harry Baldman]

Why are perfect clones sick, bad and wrong? Why is identity such a muddled issue? Simple: exploring it just raises too many questions.

Or, put it another way: perfect clones, being completely impossible (unless we in our technological progress somehow become gods, which I find incredibly unlikely), raise issues about identity that can't be solved with any available knowledge and can't be tested with any future knowledge, and the presence of such an unsolvable problem makes people either jump to certain conclusions rooted in personal beliefs or become slightly uncomfortable and ignore the issue entirely (in this respect, it is very much like subtracting infinity from infinity). So one begins to run in circles when the issue is approached from a theoretical perspective. No amount of arguing is going to provide any sort of clarity, since the question itself has no answer.

Observe how identity is a question of belief. This is because human identity itself is something we perceive axiomatically and possess no real knowledge of. Attempting to provide the concept of "you" or "me" a definition is doomed to fail, since these are the concepts you build definitions upon. To deconstruct them, you must deconstruct standard human thought first.

I like the way the preceding three paragraphs sound, but I do get the feeling I'm also talking out of my ass a little here. It's an interesting feeling.

EDIT: In a move that's a little more down-to-earth, a question to both sides of this exercise in holism vs. reductionism: can you consider your identical twin brother to be "you"? Why?

[Yoink]

How did you manage to misplace your vocal chords that dramatically?
I imagine it would feel "interesting", that's for sure.

[Harry Baldman]

How did you manage to misplace your vocal chords that dramatically?

I was bored. It happens.

[piecewise]

How did you manage to misplace your vocal chords that dramatically?

I was bored. It happens.

Misplacing organs and limbs is fairly common around here.

[GreatWyrmGold]

Why are perfect clones sick, bad and wrong? Why is identity such a muddled issue? Simple: exploring it just raises too many questions.

"It's hard to think about, so it's bad"? That's...well...that's a loser attitude, bluntly.

Or, put it another way: perfect clones, being completely impossible (unless we in our technological progress somehow become gods, which I find incredibly unlikely), raise issues about identity that can't be solved with any available knowledge and can't be tested with any future knowledge, and the presence of such an unsolvable problem makes people either jump to certain conclusions rooted in personal beliefs or become slightly uncomfortable and ignore the issue entirely (in this respect, it is very much like subtracting infinity from infinity). So one begins to run in circles when the issue is approached from a theoretical perspective. No amount of arguing is going to provide any sort of clarity, since the question itself has no answer.

That's philosophy for you. And, well, identity is a philosophical issue more than anything. (Until we get laws on the subject, but that doesn't matter much for our current discussion.)

Observe how identity is a question of belief. This is because human identity itself is something we perceive axiomatically and possess no real knowledge of.

I'm reminded of something I read about...Eucleid? Some early mathematician tried to find a bunch of axioms from which one could define the rest of geometry, and came up with five. The first four were simple, but the fifth was...complex. Eventually, though, someone used the first four to derive the fifth.
Why shouldn't these other things, identity and such, be similar? Shouldn't we at least try to see if we can derive these important things from more basic things?

Attempting to provide the concept of "you" or "me" a definition is doomed to fail, since these are the concepts you build definitions upon. To deconstruct them, you must deconstruct standard human thought first.

So?

EDIT: In a move that's a little more down-to-earth, a question to both sides of this exercise in holism vs. reductionism: can you consider your identical twin brother to be "you"? Why?

No. His experiences and personality are different. More relevant to the clone thing: Identity isn't started at birth. You can't talk about the self-image of a newborn. There's no specific time that a self-image and personality forms; I'd say it forms slowly over the first years of a child's life. It's a fuzzy area, not a "line" through time like adults' identities can be described as. You could argue that everyone starts at the same point, but not only would this be irrelevant, it would be wrong--people born in different hospitals, or even different rooms in the same hospital, or even the same room at sufficiently different times, have different experiences.

[Harry Baldman]

Why are perfect clones sick, bad and wrong? Why is identity such a muddled issue? Simple: exploring it just raises too many questions.

"It's hard to think about, so it's bad"? That's...well...that's a loser attitude, bluntly.

It's not really an attitude. It's a fact. You can't argue about something you can't properly think about. That's how you get stuck in a web of bullshit of your own making.

I'm reminded of something I read about...Eucleid? Some early mathematician tried to find a bunch of axioms from which one could define the rest of geometry, and came up with five. The first four were simple, but the fifth was...complex. Eventually, though, someone used the first four to derive the fifth.
Why shouldn't these other things, identity and such, be similar? Shouldn't we at least try to see if we can derive these important things from more basic things?

Because identity is the most basic of things. We all know what it is, but we can't define it.

So?

You can't deconstruct human thought with itself. That's the problem.

No. His experiences and personality are different. More relevant to the clone thing: Identity isn't started at birth. You can't talk about the self-image of a newborn. There's no specific time that a self-image and personality forms; I'd say it forms slowly over the first years of a child's life. It's a fuzzy area, not a "line" through time like adults' identities can be described as. You could argue that everyone starts at the same point, but not only would this be irrelevant, it would be wrong--people born in different hospitals, or even different rooms in the same hospital, or even the same room at sufficiently different times, have different experiences.

But identical twins are highly similar in personality, general proclivities and life choices. If they've grown up together (as identical twins in the same family tend to), their life experiences may turn out to be near-identical as well. The most important difference between them may be their name (though, naturally, they will have subtle physical and mental differences as well).

Also, I'd appreciate it if you stopped that 'piece-by-piece' thing you always do when you quote and reply to stuff. It's incredibly annoying to respond to.

Actually noted edit: why didn't anybody mention human death as the point that your entire nervous system ceases to function?

[GreatWyrmGold]

Why are perfect clones sick, bad and wrong? Why is identity such a muddled issue? Simple: exploring it just raises too many questions.

"It's hard to think about, so it's bad"? That's...well...that's a loser attitude, bluntly.

It's not really an attitude. It's a fact. You can't argue about something you can't properly think about. That's how you get stuck in a web of bullshit of your own making.

You can think about it, though. I have been. This is just something that, in your own words, raises questions.

I'm reminded of something I read about...Eucleid? Some early mathematician tried to find a bunch of axioms from which one could define the rest of geometry, and came up with five. The first four were simple, but the fifth was...complex. Eventually, though, someone used the first four to derive the fifth.
Why shouldn't these other things, identity and such, be similar? Shouldn't we at least try to see if we can derive these important things from more basic things?

Because identity is the most basic of things. We all know what it is, but we can't define it.

Then what do you call all the definitions we've been giving it?

So?

You can't deconstruct human thought with itself. That's the problem.

Luckily, we're not. Thought=/=Identity.

No. His experiences and personality are different. More relevant to the clone thing: Identity isn't started at birth. You can't talk about the self-image of a newborn. There's no specific time that a self-image and personality forms; I'd say it forms slowly over the first years of a child's life. It's a fuzzy area, not a "line" through time like adults' identities can be described as. You could argue that everyone starts at the same point, but not only would this be irrelevant, it would be wrong--people born in different hospitals, or even different rooms in the same hospital, or even the same room at sufficiently different times, have different experiences.

But identical twins are highly similar in personality, general proclivities and life choices. If they've grown up together (as identical twins in the same family tend to), their life experiences may turn out to be near-identical as well. The most important difference between them may be their name (though, naturally, they will have subtle physical and mental differences as well).

Near-identical? Yes. Identical? No.
And "identical twins" aren't nearly as similar as you seem to think they are. Unless they want to troll everyone.

Also, I'd appreciate it if you stopped that 'piece-by-piece' thing you always do when you quote and reply to stuff. It's incredibly annoying to respond to.

How else am I supposed to reply to a bunch of things?
And, um, you're doing the same thing. (And I find it incredibly convenient to reply to.)

[Xantalos]

Make a list?

[GreatWyrmGold]

I've found that that's a pain. You constantly need to check back to remember what the hell #4 was.

[Xantalos]

Easier than copy/pasting the hell out of all the quotes in the text wall.

[Parisbre56]

@GWG: Actually, the problem with the 5 axioms is that while you can use 4 of them to prove the first four (you can use 2,3,4 and 5 to prove 1, for example), you can't use 1,2,3 and 4 to prove number 5. It has been proven that proving 5 using the other 4 is impossible.
Number 5 is the one that talks about parallel lines. So, if you change number 5, you get non-euclidean geometries.

@Harry Baldman: It's very simple. If you consider your twin brother to be you, then for you, he is you, because that is the label your programming assigns to him. Assuming there is no god, no perfect observer, then there can be no true objective authority on who is you. We can use legal arguments (you is whoever has got identification papers proving they are you that can hold in court) or common opinions (you is whoever others think you is) to define you in some more generally acceptable way, but in the end the matter would still be subjective, a result of the programming we have inherited from our biology and our environment.

[Harry Baldman]

*fragmented posting that bugs the shit out of me*

Ah, but you can't define identity. You can name some of its parts, like your name, your hobbies, whatever, but you can't explain what it is without invoking itself (you're certainly welcome to try, and I'd like to see you succeed). And I did mention that to deconstruct identity, you need to deconstruct human thought due to the way the concept of things being what they are is integral to its basic functioning. Hence why you can't deconstruct human thought with itself (here we can see my problem with the 'bit-by-bit' method of quoting - it removes context and points need to be restated repeatedly).

Another problem that I'm seeking an answer to with the question about identical twins is the issue about difference in experiences. You mentioned previously that you can see no difference between two molecularly identical people even though they have different experiences ever since the moment of cloning. Identical twins were actually the same cell in the very beginning of their development, which goes even further than the aforementioned similarity. All that differentiates them is experience. At what point is their identical origin made irrelevant by experience? Are they at any point interchangeable?

Finally, you're not replying to a bunch of things. You're replying to a single post.

@Harry Baldman: It's very simple. If you consider your twin brother to be you, then for you, he is you, because that is the label your programming assigns to him. Assuming there is no god, no perfect observer, then there can be no true objective authority on who is you. We can use legal arguments (you is whoever has got identification papers proving they are you that can hold in court) or common opinions (you is whoever others think you is) to define you in some more generally acceptable way, but in the end the matter would still be subjective, a result of the programming we have inherited from our biology and our environment.

What if Group A perceives you as one thing, Group B thinks you're something else, Group C believes you to be another thing entirely, and you don't have any opinion at all on who you are due to devoting no thought to it? What is your identity in that case? Can you have no identity?

[GreatWyrmGold]

Easier than copy/pasting the hell out of all the quotes in the text wall.

What makes you think that's what people do? It's certainly not the most effective way to do stuff.

@GWG: Actually, the problem with the 5 axioms is that while you can use 4 of them to prove the first four (you can use 2,3,4 and 5 to prove 1, for example), you can't use 1,2,3 and 4 to prove number 5. It has been proven that proving 5 using the other 4 is impossible.
Number 5 is the one that talks about parallel lines. So, if you change number 5, you get non-euclidean geometries.

Like it matters which axiom could be proved from the others.

Ah, but you can't define identity. You can name some of its parts, like your name, your hobbies, whatever, but you can't explain what it is without invoking itself (you're certainly welcome to try, and I'd like to see you succeed). And I did mention that to deconstruct identity, you need to deconstruct human thought due to the way the concept of things being what they are is integral to its basic functioning. Hence why you can't deconstruct human thought with itself (here we can see my problem with the 'bit-by-bit' method of quoting - it removes context and points need to be restated repeatedly).

I notice that you're not addressing my points so much as saying "you're wrong and I'm right".

Another problem that I'm seeking an answer to with the question about identical twins is the issue about difference in experiences. You mentioned previously that you can see no difference between two molecularly identical people even though they have different experiences ever since the moment of cloning. Identical twins were actually the same cell in the very beginning of their development, which goes even further than the aforementioned similarity. All that differentiates them is experience. At what point is their identical origin made irrelevant by experience? Are they at any point interchangeable?

I never said they weren't different, I said that you can't call one "the real Harry" and one "the fake Harry". They have equal right to claim being Harry.
As to identical twins...well, I've said it before and I'll say it again: Identity has nothing to do with the physical body, barring obvious things. What matters is the mind, the experiences/personality/etc. These don't really exist at birth, certainly not at conception, and develop over the first years of life.

Finally, you're not replying to a bunch of things. You're replying to a single post.

...Huh?