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[Tarqiup Inua]

Yes, it's public secret in Czech Republic where I come from that high-ranking individuals abuse surveillance and very often there is a scandal where politicians from current governing party (whichever one it might be at the moment) exacerbate things for criminal investigators. Mostly financial criminality thing that is connected to our officials. US might not be there, yet - not to such degree, so it would be good yanks they kept their eyes open. It's a big country that has lot of influence.

[Sheb]

Just read this. It makes a good point: is it ok for Google to read your e-mails to sell you stuff and pass the infos to third-party? If you watch youtube video of beheading in Pakistan and then send a e-mail to your brother saying you're almost done assembling the package but you lack a pressure cooker, is it normal for Google to send your infos to a seller of kitchenware, but not to the NSA?

[PanH]

Russia offers to consider an asylum request too.

[GlyphGryph]

Just read this. It makes a good point: is it ok for Google to read your e-mails to sell you stuff and pass the infos to third-party? If you watch youtube video of beheading in Pakistan and then send a e-mail to your brother saying you're almost done assembling the package but you lack a pressure cooker, is it normal for Google to send your infos to a seller of kitchenware, but not to the NSA?

I'll copy/paste the best response I've seen to this:

Most people regard advertising as a minor nuisance.

The people who've worried about Google and Facebook invading their privacy in a systematic way have been most worried that the enormous databases they compile may be used for social or political manipulation. The nightmare scenario would be that governments would get direct access to these databases and use them for political control.

We have just had confirmation that that nightmare scenario is in fact already happening.

The US government has been known to describe system cracking, labor actions, nonviolent protests, and even investigative journalism, as "terrorism", and there has been a trend towards slapping "terrorism" charges in mundane criminal proceedings.

Also, the US government has asserted its right to summarily execute suspected terrorists, or to imprison them without trial or review of evidence, and to torture them. And while the victims of these policies have overwhelmingly been people outside the US, major politicians have asserted that they should be able to apply the same policies to US citizens.

Some have pointed out that there is some selfishness in that there has been more outrage expressed at indiscriminate surveillance by the NSA than there has been at drone strikes or other violence routinely committed by the US in the "war on terror". There is a lot of justice in that criticism, but it has to be pointed out, also, that the people in the best position to restrain the US government are people in the US, and if our ability to resist is significantly reduced, it will become much more difficult to bring the US government under control.

Yes, the government should know less than google. The government should be limited in a lot of ways that individuals and corporations don't need to be, because regulations are based on the industry, and there are certain things an organization in the business of governing should not be doing, since it impinges their ability to govern effectively. This is one of those things. And right now, the government knows far more than Google does.

Not that there shouldn't be regulations covering Google's use and distribution of said data, of course, it's just significantly less important. There's a reason we wrote an entire document over here in the US about the limitations of government and then added a specific phrase at the end saying "oh yeah, and there's a WHOLE bunch of shut that individuals and whatnot can do that the government isn't allowed to."

[palsch]

For those interested in the NSA-flavoured perspective this is worth a read. Dripping with contempt in places, but still worth it to understand how the leaks and realities are viewed by insiders.

Just read this. It makes a good point: is it ok for Google to read your e-mails to sell you stuff and pass the infos to third-party? If you watch youtube video of beheading in Pakistan and then send a e-mail to your brother saying you're almost done assembling the package but you lack a pressure cooker, is it normal for Google to send your infos to a seller of kitchenware, but not to the NSA?

When it comes to ads they don't sell any information. They sell impressions and clicks.

The advertiser gives them an advert and asks google to get it in front of as many people who might click it as possible. Google then uses purely internal tools that no-one else should ever have access to to work out what users are most likely to click the ad and put it in front of them.

Their actual philosophy on big data and privacy (particularly what qualifies as identifying information) is somewhat worrying in places and it's worth paying attention to ongoing lobbying efforts in writing EU privacy regulations. But I don't think you can argue they sell information in this particular sense.

It's actually interesting that the NSA and Google appear to use some similar internal procedures to prevent abuse of personal data. These include minimisation (retroactively stripping collected data of identifying information) and controlled access to databases (something that got Facebook in trouble a few years back). Arguably the NSA are somewhat more advanced in this area, especially if you trust anything the guy I linked above says.

[Sir Finkus]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22850901
Well then
:edit: Please actually read the article.  The headline is overly sensationalistic and implies that he's gone without explanation.  I lost respect for the BBC because of it.

If you lost respect for the BBC because of that headline you clearly don't watch/read enough of their stuff.

I don't to be honest, maybe I'm naive. 

[SalmonGod]

For those interested in the NSA-flavoured perspective this is worth a read. Dripping with contempt in places, but still worth it to understand how the leaks and realities are viewed by insiders.

This reads to me like absolutely everything else we've heard from any official that isn't themselves a whistleblower.

"Your concerns are healthy and valid.  However, you're in grave danger, so you'll just have to trust us."

Same thing I've been hearing for the last 12 years or so, yet I've seen more harm done to the country by the surveillance/police state than by the threats that justify them.

[misko27]

For those interested in the NSA-flavoured perspective this is worth a read. Worth it to understand how the leaks and realities are viewed by insiders.

This reads to me like absolutely everything else we've heard from any official that isn't themselves a whistleblower.

"Your concerns are healthy and valid.  However, you're in grave danger, so you'll just have to trust us."

Same thing I've been hearing for the last 12 years or so, yet I've seen more harm done to the country by the surveillance/police state than by the threats that justify them.

Yes, but on the other hand, you wouldn't you have believed anything they said anyway, so of course you saw what you wanted to see.

[SalmonGod]

Not sure what I'm supposed to see other than what he wrote.

I mean he says the same things palsch has already been describing about the FISA process.  How when they want to dig through someone's data, they submit a report and it has to be approved.  Yeah, we know.  There are processes and layers.  Can we get some substantiation on how much of an effect these processes have?  Maybe some abstract data on how often these requests are denied?  Something about percentage of persons investigated leading to actual information about terrorism?  Anything?  No.  Just the same old, "It's really, truly done with integrity, we super promise real hard."

I've seen plenty of information about how these tools have been used against people that have nothing to do with terrorism.  That's tangible, quantifiable stuff.  If I'm supposed to see the other side, then the other side will have to counter with something equally substantial.

[Solifuge]

Until recently, I never really thought of the US or the EU as places you'd need to seek asylum from for challenging the government, or attempting to hold them accountable. That sort of thing happens often enough for writers and journalists in other parts of the world, but I was always of a mind that it couldn't happen here. Wouldn't happen here.

Then Julian Assange happened. Then Bradley Manning. And now Edward Snowden. I don't like this trend.

The problem with these surveillance programs is that the "oversight" that NSA officials keep citing as keeping these surveilance programs in check, is in name only. The people who are in charge of this oversight aren't allowed to know about what these programs are actually doing, and they don't have access to the information being surveiled. They're in charge of oversight, but can't see anything that they're overseeing. It's like posting a bunch of blind people on lookout duty, and calling that good enough.

As a result, like SalmonGod said, it leaves us having to trust them that they really are working with integrity. When nothing is holding them accountable. And as history has proven, when people are given such authority without anyone to hold them accountable, individuals WILL begin to abuse it.

EDIT: Something I caught on a radio story on NPR the other night indicated that, whenever the Constitutionality of these surveillance programs has been brought to court, the defendants on behalf of the surveillance program in question have done everything they can to get the case thrown out; usually through calling evidence into question, or otherwise attacking the case or legal definitions itself. And they've succeeded every time so far.

In fact, due to this sort of fancy legal footwork, the constitutionality of these surveillance programs has never been successfully brought before the court... It's never actually been considered!

[Sheb]

We have data on how rigorous the FISA court process is. Last year, the NSA made over 1700 demands, of which exactly 0 were refused.

[Sir Finkus]

Here's what the "normals" seem to think about the whole thing.  I'm disappointed, but not shocked.  I did an informal check of twitter and it seems to be about 80% tea party/conservative folks being "OUTRAGED", 15% "lol nsa knows what porn I like", 4% calling Snowden a traitor, and then 1% civil liberties folks saying "I told you so".

Pay special attention to the partisan graph, it's nearly an inversion from back in 2006 when Bush was in power.

[XXSockXX]

Well surly the tea-party people would have felt better being watched over by a good christian like Bush, instead of being spied on by muslim socialist Obama.
I think the problem is more that a majority of the population thinks of modern communication as toys and gadgets and doesn't realize that it's safer to shout out private information in the street than to post it on the internet.

[penguinofhonor]

BBC does relatively sensational article titles all the time. It's not a new phenomenon.

It's less that the BBC sucks and more that there are tons of people who are reading only the headline and flipping the fuck out.

[RedKing]

RedKing, couldn't you get in trouble for approving of whistleblowers? Also, what do you think of PRISM, if you can tell us about it?

palsch: what your aticle describe doesn't seem so far removed from what Snowden claim. The main differences with the wildest claims are that 1) The internet companies know what they give the NSA, as they are answering FISC orders, and 2) It all goes through a FISA court.

But now, the process of handing over the informations through PRISM may well be automated. And given the tradition in the US government to interpret the law in far-reaching way (like the fact that apparently Obama's talking over a meeting of whether or not to kill someone fullfill due process), I wouldn't be surprised if analysts had access to the informations by default, with the FISA court analyzing the stuff afterward.


P.S. Also, as a non-US citizen, fuck your government guys.

I haven't seen any of the stuff released yet on PRISM, and haven't had time to go look. And I'd have to do it at home on a different computer. I can't get in trouble for expressing approval of a whistleblower, but I *can* get in trouble for viewing classified material that I'm not cleared for on a government computer. It was made abundantly clear to everyone in the Bureau (not just us IT wonks) that viewing the Wikileaks thing while at work (i.e. on government hardware) could be construed as a Federal offense. I did catch a bit on the radio on NPR, so I have a general fuzzy notion of what was released.

Here's my take on the general situation:
1. Could he have had access to what he claims?
Absolutely. There are literally millions of people with security clearances of one stripe or another. I would think that almost by virtue of working for the NSA, you'd need a Top Secret clearance. The fucking janitorial staff has security clearances. After all, if they come across a scrap of paper with passwords or something, you want to make sure they don't sell it or post it online. (Incidentally, this is why we had to do our own vacuuming in "the bunker"...no cleared janitorial staff available).

2. Could an extrajudicial system like this exist without the collusion of thousands of contractors?
Yes, and here's how -- most people aren't going to see the whole picture, just their tiny little piece of the whole. I dealt with technical requests that were unequivocally related to the "Fast and Furious" operation at ATF, but had no knowledge of the parameters of the operation at the time. All I knew is that they were assigning a LOT of people down to the southwest border, which seemed perfectly legit because of the drug war in Mexico. If I had been more curious and more willing to pry around the edges of what I was cleared for, I probably could have pieced together some of it. Or hell, if I had just stumbled across a briefing PowerPoint on a network share....IT folks often have broad network rights, which mean being able to get at the juiciest stuff, even if we're not technically cleared for it. That's a real problem in terms of security, but it's a conundrum because if you seriously curtail your IT folks' network access then shit will take FOREVER to get done.

3. Why do I think Snowden didn't go the route of Bradley Manning and just dump it all? And/or why yay on Snowden and boo on Manning?
Well, look how well that worked out for him. Plus, Manning was considerably younger (22). I don't think he'd really, REALLY thought through the consequences of his actions -- either to himself or to the individuals compromised by the leak. What Manning did placed *people* in operational jeopardy (especially non-US personnel). What Snowden placed a *program* in jeopardy. I'm fine with programs being killed to prove a point.

Also, Snowden came out publicly when he didn't have to, and not in a manner that suggests self-aggrandizement. Manning was busted because he started bragging.

4. Security vs. privacy
I'm ambiguous on this point. Facebook has an interface whereby law enforcement can request access to an individual's page, messages, etc. but they have to provide a lot of detail first, and it's a time-limited access. You can't just go on a fishing expedition. That said, people can be fairly fucking stupid about what they'll post on Facebook (bragging about your new gun that you're legally prohibited from owning? Not smart, bro.) and social media in particular can be of great value to intel folks trying to build up a picture of criminal organizations. You'd be shocked at how many gangs basically map themselves out via their Twitter and FB friend links. Cell phone data....let's just say that phones (especially smartphones with GPS) might as well be a fucking transponder. I've got an old-fashioned phone but even a simple cell phone is essentially a tracking device that we voluntarily accept because of its other functions.

So there is definite utility to getting at online data like this. But there's definitely a lot of potential for abuse, especially this notion of "let us collect EVERYTHING and then we'll only go back and mine it after the fact". I've heard some pundits from the intel community pointing to the Tsarnaevs as proof of this and saying that they were able to go look at their Facebook, email, etc. and quickly determine their links. To which my response is: Big fucking whoop. Didn't do much good to stop them in Boston. And it still took locking down an entire major American city for two days and an old-fashioned manhunt to track them down. It's not Minority Report. No amount of intel is going to let you predict and prevent attacks because the level of detail you'd need would be unacceptably intrusive, and you'd be completely buried in that same level of detail for the 99.99% of the populace who AREN'T a threat.

I won't get into the abstract philosophical debate, but I will say that I'm increasingly uncomfortable with the surveillance state concept.