Soviet production was certainly focused on different areas thanks to Lend Lease and the strategic bombing of Germany, yet both of these factors are overblown considering the fact that the Soviets still outproduced the Germans in nearly every aspect from 1940 to 1942, while Lend Lease and serious strategic bombing only had significant effects by around 1944.
To go into a bit more detail with regards to Lend Lease, the Soviets mainly received three main things from the Americans: locomotives, food, and jeeps/trucks. Locomotives are often brought up as a major contribution, but they actually were largely unnecessary; as a result of the German advance, most of the extended Soviet rail lines were occupied, yet most of the locomotives the Soviets had before the war were safely evacuated along with other industrial materials. So the Soviets were sitting on a pile of trains that they couldn't use, in amounts that dwarfed what the Americans sent over, and by the time the American locomotives were at all useful the Germans were basically beaten anyway. Food was useful, but the food supplied was insufficient to feed the Red Army for even a few months, and thus was a minor benefit at best. The arrival of jeeps and trucks was the most helpful part of Lend Lease, but they almost all arrived after 1944, so that doesn't explain the superiority of Soviet production before that time.
Anyhow, in terms of the air war, the Soviets still outproduced the Germans, with their main problems being (A) inferior plane designs and (B) a lack of experienced pilots. The first problem was largely solved after 1943 when the Yak-9 and Yak-3 became the common Soviet fighter planes, while the second became less of an issue over the course of the war as Soviet pilots became more experienced. By the end of the war, Soviet fighters were generally superior to those fielded by the Luftwaffe, so even the air war would be won by the Soviets.
The soviet air quality advantage in the late war didn't just happen on it's own. 80% of the german plane deployments and losses were in the west. If you remove the west from the equation you are talking about a soviet airforce that would be completely inadequate. The Yak planes were good planes but they only built ~20k of them compared to hundreds of thousands of allied planes. The Il-2 was a great plane but it would have been limited to nighttime bombings if the western allies hadn't forced the Germans to cede air superiority.
1940-1942 isn't a good metric to judge production efficiency by. The numbers are low and the Soviets are still mostly making obsolete designs. The Germans are still churning out a fair amount of obsolete equipment for that matter. It's mostly just talking about the fact that in '42 the Soviets production of T-34s skyrockets and they make 4 times as many as the past years combined. The Soviets only produce more tanks in '40 if you count light tanks like T-26 and Panzer II. The Soviets production of medium+heavy is only slightly ahead in '41. The Germans underestimated the Soviets and are slower to ramp up production to their full potential.
And no, the Soviets weren't sitting on a pile of trains they couldn't use. Soviet production system was entirely redesigned around their limited train supplies. For instance the number of manhours that happened under the factory roof for a T-34 was 5 times as high as the hours put into a M-4 on site because the Soviets couldn't afford to ship parts around like the Americans could. If the Soviets hadn't been getting allied trucks and trains they wouldn't have been able to shift their train and vehicle production and still get supplies at the front. Production doesn't turn on a dime like in a videogame. Shifting lend lease from war goods to industrial goods was a deliberate decision not a mistake.
Although the Soviets were a little more committed to mobalization the soviets simply would not have had a production advantage if it weren't for the western front. After '42 the Soviet population was smaller and less industrialized. The simply could not win a production contest on a level playing field.
The Soviets wouldn't necessarily win the air war in absolute terms like the Allies were able to, with the capability to strategically bomb Germany at will, but they certainly would be more than capable of defeating the Germans in the manner they had previously, when necessary to support ground offensives. They proved themselves more than capable of this from 1943 onwards.
Soviet production of obsolete equipment was higher in the early years, but this was more due to issues with the reorganization of the Red Army than with inherent Soviet production problems. Specifically, the Soviet Union had invested heavily in military equipment in the past, but that meant that the Red Army was state of the art in 1934. Many issues were noted with both equipment and the command structure due to the Winter War, so the Soviet forces were completely restructured in 1940, with the expected end of this restructuring to occur in 1942. However, in 1941, when the Germans attacked, the Soviets were not even remotely organized yet, which is part of why Stalin was unwilling to even consider the possibility of a German attack at the time. Meanwhile, the fact of the matter is that the bulk of Soviet land was still occupied, and yet they outproduced the Germans at the time, with quality being made up for well before the major counterattacks of 1943 onwards. Further, while the Germans were slower to completely ramp up production for war, there was a point at which both sides were completely geared for war (around 1943-44), yet there was no point at which the Germans reached production parity with the Soviets, not to mention the fact that Soviet pre-war production outpaced German production too.
I'll admit to say that the Soviets weren't using the locomotives they had was an exaggeration, but they didn't suffer from serious shortages of locomotives at any point. Again, the bulk of Soviet rail was in the West, which was occupied by the Wehrmacht, while the major success of the Soviets in 1941 was the evacuation of nearly all of their industry beyond the Urals, which conveniently enough included almost all of their pre-war stock of locomotives. These same locomotives were used through the entire war, only being supplemented by American locomotives from 1944 onwards, as they were more than sufficient for Soviet logistical needs (after some restructuring of production, which was occurring regardless). Perhaps a hypothetical Soviet Union fighting on its own and reaching halfway through Poland would have required additional locomotive production to supplement the existing stock, but that is a completely different situation from what we're considering. Trucks, jeeps, etc were still extremely helpful, but again, Soviet production was not hugely affected considering that the bulk of them arrived only at the end of 1944, by which point the Soviets had long held an advantage.
The notable thing is that, while the Soviet industrial workforce was significantly smaller than that of the Germans, they still outproduced the Germans simply due to having a much, much more efficient system of production that the Germans simply weren't able to replicate. Finally, the difference in manpower was at its worst in 1942, with the Soviets workforce (and army) growing quite steadily from that point onwards, whereas the Germans had a significantly harder time replacing lost troops. From 1943 onwards, the Eastern front was pretty well characterized by steady Soviet advances and victories against German counterattacks, coupled with general improvements in the Soviet situation, so it seems unlikely that even the full might of Germany would be capable of turning things around.
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