Because I'm all about making claims in good faith, here's some proof that an individual human is highly fallible, irrational, and prone to making ridiculously absurd mistakes in judgment:
Effects of Mood on the ability to Make Decisions
"This paper begins to answer the call to broaden current theories of individual decision-making by including in them the effects of human mood. Grounding our arguments in psychological literature on the effects of mood on information processing, motivation, and decision heuristics, we develop hypotheses about how mood can significantly affect individuals' use of structured decision protocols. In support of our hypotheses, results from an experimental study of complex decision-making suggest that, in situations where a structured decision protocol is the usual method of decision-making, individuals in moderately negative moods are significantly more likely than those in moderately positive moods to: (1) carefully execute all the steps of a structured decision protocol, (2) execute the steps of a structured decision protocol in the correct order, and (3) rely on the outcome of the structured decision protocol as the primary basis for the decision. We discuss these findings in terms of their implications for both organizational decision models and psychological models of mood and decision-making. In general, our findings help establish mood as an important variable in models of organizational decision-making and help shed light on often conflicting findings about the benefits of positive vs. negative mood for individual decision-making."Credibility judgments of narratives: Language, plausibility, and absorption"Two experiments were conducted in order to find out whether textual features of narratives differentially affect credibility judgments made by judges having different levels of absorption (a disposition associated with rich visual imagination). Participants in both experiments were exposed to a textual narrative and requested to judge whether the narrator actually experienced the event he described in his story. In Experiment 1, the narrative varied in terms of language (literal, figurative) and plausibility (ordinary, anomalous). In Experiment 2, the narrative varied in terms of language only. The participants’ perceptions of the plausibility of the story described and the extent to which they were absorbed in reading were measured. The data from both experiments together suggest that the groups applied entirely different criteria in credibility judgments. For high-absorption individuals, their credibility judgment depends on the degree to which the text can be assimilated into their own vivid imagination, whereas for low-absorption individuals it depends mainly on plausibility. That is, high-absorption individuals applied an experiential mental set while judging the credibility of the narrator, whereas low-absorption individuals applied an instrumental mental set. Possible cognitive mechanisms and implications for credibility judgments are discussed."
Word type effects in false recall: Concrete, abstract, and emotion word critical lures
"Previous research has demonstrated that definable qualities of verbal stimuli have implications for memory. For example, the distinction between concrete and abstract words has led to the finding that concrete words have an advantage in memory tasks (i.e., the concreteness effect). However, other word types, such as words that label specific human emotions, may also affect memory processes. This study examined the effects of word type on the production of false memories by using a list-learning false memory paradigm. Participants heard lists of words that were highly associated to nonpresented concrete, abstract, or emotion words (i.e., the critical lures) and then engaged in list recall. Emotion word critical lures were falsely recalled at a significantly higher rate (with the effect carried by the positively valenced critical lures) than concrete and abstract critical lures. These findings suggest that the word type variable has implications for our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie recall and false recall."So, it's plain to see that humans can easily fall prey to misjudgments based on things like mood, word choice, learning style, and past experience. It is not reasonable to assume that, given infinite personal freedoms, people would naturally work in a way that benefits society as a whole, in the longterm, much less the short.
From this, how can you claim that denying empirical evidence, denying history, denying empathy, denying current situations makes one versed in "Objective" thought? How can you know anything "Objectively" if you place yourself so far from evidence, and the truth? How can you claim to make rational decisions if you're going out of your way to ignore known effects that stem from known causes?
How is Objectivism/Libertarianism, as a policy, able to prove itself capable of doing anything, outside of, again: "I want this to happen, so I will say that it will happen. If it does not happen, it wasn't free enough."?
I put this to you, honestly.
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Topic: Objections to Objectivism (Read 14559 times)