http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/fraying-deal-on-blind-chinese-dissident-points-to-power-of-security-apparatus/2012/05/03/gIQAN5O7yT_story.html
There's also that. Although in this instance, my gut feeling is that the a significant part of the Party in Beijing is sympathetic to Chen.
WP has
another good article here re: what I've been describing -- an authoritarian state, but
shan gao huang di yuan ("mountains are high, the Emperor is far away" -- an old saying referring to the tendency of provincial authorities to ignore or even contramand the directives of the central government). Although I disagree with Bequelin's analysis that this is somehow outsourcing repression to the local level. The local level has
always been the primary locus of repression, even in Mao's day. The Red Guards acted without central coordination or direction, and it was finally their excesses that caused Mao to act to crush them because they got out of control and began to threaten the central government itself.
@scriver: Thanks.
愤, fèn: anger, resentment
青, qīng: youth (although the same character and pronunciation can also mean blue-green. Go-go-gadget-contextual-language-weirdness!)
For the time being, the anger has been mostly online or in angry but nonviolent protests. However, it has gotten violent from time to time, as when groups of young men attacked the Japanese embassy in 2005. The PRC had been engaging in its regular tradition of a little anti-Japanese Two-Minute Hate, this time over some new textbooks with a serious right-wing slant that whitewashed the Japanese war record in WWII, and also because Japan was lobbying for a permanent seat on the Security Council at the time. (Should also be noted that there were protests in both Koreas as well).
State media outlets had plenty of editorials criticizing Japan, CCTV was running a slate of old war movies (where the Japanese Army are depicted as uniformly, almost laughably, evil), etc. Then people start trashing any businesses with a Japanese name (even when they were Chinese-owned and operated franchises) and attacked the embassy itself in Beijing. Suddenly the editorial tone changed bigtime, and all efforts went into restoring calm. That episode really spooked the authorities, because an angry mob is one of the most dangerous things in Chinese history. They saw that with the advent of modern communications, they can't just turn on and turn off popular outrage like a water faucet. As a result, I've never seen anywhere near the concentrated level of anti-Japanese agitprop on state media since. State media was even sympathetic to the Japanese after the tsunami, which had the interesting effect of sending the
fenqing into a frenzy, accusing the state-run media of being traitors for daring to say anything nice about the hated Japanese devils. Thankfully, most people online just rolled their eyes and said things along the line of "STFU troll, you're giving us all a bad name".
I've been in more than a few flame wars on the China Daily forums, not least because how dare a
laowai like me dare make any criticism of anything in China, especially when I'm not even an expat resident? Fucking imperialist white devil. They're the Chinese version of "America #1 or GTFO, u commiepinkofag!!" but thankfully not that numerous.
Where it gets worrisome is when they even start attacking respected academics and former government officials over things like saying, "Yeah, Mao kinda screwed us up in some ways, like the Cultural Revolution." It's kinda analogous to the young men in Russia who are all into Stalin nowadays, because they didn't have to actually live through his crazy-ass rule. People who were there....not so much love.
That's a win for Chen (sort of...being forced into asylum in a foreign country probably isn't high on his list of life goals), and it's a win for the Shandong officials, because he's out of sight, out of mind, and they'll likely get off without a penalty. It's a loss for Beijing, because they look powerless to punish corruption in their territory, powerless to prevent their citizenry from fleeing the country, and powerless to keep the US out of its domestic affairs. It's also a loss for the US because it makes it look like we're trying to intervene, and it opens up the door for more and more dissidents to try and use the US as an escape plan when things get too hot. Honestly, Beijing needs these sort of people to remain in China and help them root out corruption at the local levels. They know it's there, they probably even know which officials are the worst, but without hard evidence and some weight of popular opinion on their side, it's incredibly difficult for them to penetrate the web of favors and kickbacks and entrenched interests and actually remove the worst offenders.
RedKing, I'm interested in knowing why you'd think the top levels of the party have any interest in actually rooting out corruption? I know they'd want to root out the kinds of corruption that might be extremely unpopular with the public, but other than that, I can't think of any particular reason they'd do so, considering they themselves are basically entrenched in their positions specifically because of the top levels of government being corrupt.
Because it's bad for business. And it makes running the country a bitch and a half when you make a corrective action and then have to push, pull and beg to get anyone to follow it. Couple of examples:
1. Several years ago, somebody crunched the numbers in Beijing and decided that the economy was growing
too fast and they were risking getting into a bubble and burning out. So they tried to think of good ways to slow down the economy that wouldn't just be wasteful. One idea was to shut down a lot of little private steel-making operations in Guangdong. See, back in Mao's day, he had this "great" idea of how to increase China's steel production: give every peasant a small forge. Then, when they're not out in the rice fields, they can spend their spare time making steel! Of course, they had minimal training and the raw materials they had to work with were total crap, so the quality of the steel they made was laughable. Most of it was utterly unusable, but hey...on paper at least, China's steel production skyrocketed.
Most of these fell into disuse once the central government realized the steel was worthless. With the advent of the SEZ in Guangdong, and the rising price of steel worldwide, enterprising Chinese entrepeneurs went around buying up all these old forges and making "steel factories", which were basically warehouses full of mini-forges with a bunch of guys smelting and hammering away. The training was only marginally better, but the raw inputs tended to be at least a little more uniform. The resulting output was low-quality but usuable. And the construction boom meant that there was a voracious market for any kind of steel, so these places were insanely profitable. And more or less utterly unregulated.
So suddenly they're illegal, but the local officials down there have been getting kickbacks from the "factory" owners for some time. They have an invested interest in not shutting them down. So they would either "shut them down" and let them reopen the next day without officially notifying the government, and then report them as shut down, or they'd just say "Sorry, there are no illegal factories in our district." Estimates are that less than 15% of the factories slated for shutdown were actually shut down.
2. There was a directive to encourage "green development" at the local level. Officials were urged to find ways to make their district/village/province/whatever more green. In Shaanxi, there was an official who ordered hundreds of workers to go to a nearby open-pit quarry and
paint the entire quarry with green paint. Mission Accomplished.